Tuesday, May 20, 2014

A War of Liberation

The Mainichi Shimbun erupts

The conventional wisdom on the Japanese media is that the Sankei Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun are conservative newspapers while the Mainichi Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun are liberal newspapers. When it comes to World War II, there is a wide divergence of opinion between the liberals and the conservatives. At least that's what the conventional wisdom says. Beneath the surface, however, there is much more agreement than is commonly believed.

While on most every day, the Mainichi Shimbun slavishly publishes whatever they think will not offend the West, every now and then, once every blue moon, for whatever reason, the Mainichi Shimbun gets really pissed off and tells the world what they really think.

A year ago they published an editorial called "Japan must find middle road on war responsibility." (mainichi.jp/english/english/perspectives/news/20130429p2a00m0na002000c.html)

“Japan's war in Asia was a war of aggression. At the same time, however, Japan shattered the European colonial empires in Southeast Asia. This is a balanced view of the war. Both wars of aggression and colonial rule are indefensible, and neither was the exclusive specialty of militarist Japan.”

“How many nations had the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and other European states colonized from the 16th century onward? There is no need to count up the misdeeds of our friends, but I'd like people to remember their history.”

One would have thought such an argument would more likely come from the Yomiuri Shimbun. Ironically, based on what I've seen, the Yomiuri Shimbun is much more cowardly and much more reticent to publish articles that might offend the West.

The Nakano School

The decision to create the Nakano School was made in 1937. (Kindle Location 65 of The Shadow Warriors of Nakano) The school opened its doors a year later in 1938.

The first batch of students “graduated in the summer of 1939.” (Kindle Location 427 of The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

They were told “that a single spy was more valuable than a division of soldiers.” (Kindle Locations 363 of The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

“His teachers had also drilled into him the lessons of sacrifice underpinning ‘spiritual education’ at the school.” (Kindle Locations 408 of The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

They were given a “sense that they were elite defenders of the empire.” (Kindle Location 409 of The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

One last meeting

Before World War II began, Japan sent a special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, to America to negotiate. While there, he had a conversation with Frederick Moore, an American who had been intimately involved in U.S. - Japan relations for decades.

“I know what governments say and I know what they do,” said Kurusu. “I was for a long time, as you know, in charge of commercial relations in the Foreign Office, and I know from experience how reluctant other countries were to deal fairly with us.”

“I know, too, and I suppose the United States was one of the worst,” said Moore.

“I can’t say your country was the worst,” replied Kurusu. “The British were the worst.”

Some things never change.

Moore told Kurusu that he hoped World War II would teach everyone a lesson.

Kurusu just shook his head in disbelief.

Less than an hour after the attack on Pearl Harbor began, the Japanese government sent out a secret message which declared that there was now a crisis in relations with Britain. (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201304140030)

You are probably thinking that Japan should have sent out the message which said there was a crisis with America. But you would be mistaken. Though World War II did result in the dissolution of the Japanese Empire, that was a short term setback for Japan. For America, the war resulted in a dramatic increase in power. By contrast, the war was devastating for the British. The war resulted in the destruction of the British Empire. Britain has been in decline ever since.

Japan wanted the war, in part, because Japan wanted to bring an end to their own militarism which was a huge waste of resources. But Japan still wanted to remove European influence from East Asia.

“For two or more generations the goal of the Japanese militarists had been set,” said Moore. “One by one, as the opportunities offered, they planned to drive the Western Powers out of their special lodgments on the Western Pacific. To them it seemed logical that, as Japanese were kept out of the United States, Canada and Australia, Britons and Americans should be made to leave East Asia.”

After the war, Europe was unable to reestablish its influence in East Asia because Japan fomented insurgencies in all their former colonies. In the coming days I will offer more evidence which supports this conclusion.

On the day Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Japanese ambassador handed a final note to the U.S. Secretary of State. The note included the following section:

“It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.”

Peta

Before World War II, Indonesia was a Dutch colony known as the Dutch East Indies. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese military quickly deposed the Dutch and began their occupation of Indonesia at the beginning of March 1942. (Page 75 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) From that point forward, Japan began to create an army which eventually became known as the Pembela Tanah Air, or PETA. PETA was the creation of a Japanese intelligence agency, the Beppan. (Page 91 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

The training began at youth centers throughout Java, either in the spring or the summer of 1942. Recruits were “given para-military training and indoctrination” (Page 104 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) Recruits were trained for six months. After finishing that, some of them were selected to go to the Tanggerang Center for further training. The first batch of recruits for the Tanggerang Center began their training in January 1943. (Page 104 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

Although activities related to the creation of PETA began almost immediately after the Japanese captured Indonesia, the formal announcement of the creation of PETA took place much later, on October 3, 1943. (Page 98 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) The Tanggerang Center was closed. The officials who worked there were transferred to a new facility, the Officer Training Center, which opened its doors at the end of 1943. The best students from Tanggerang were underwent officer training at this new facility. (Page 105 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) Recruits at this facility then underwent another three months of training. Upon completion of their training, the graduates had to go out and recruit and training their own recruits. (Page 107 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

In February 1944, the graduates, accompanied by Japanese officers, moved to Bali to train another three battalions. (Page 108 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) Officer training was completed in June. By the time the war had ended, Peta had 34,500 soldiers. (Page 109 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

Training for staff officers began in January 1944. (Page 110 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

Spiritual training

Chudancho training

“The training was tough but effective, according to those who went through the program. A day’s training lasted all day, with only six hours of sleep. Long all-day marches were followed by running, in turn followed by jumping into a cold pool. The program was not elaborate technically and did not include study of military strategy and science. It was designed to teach Indonesians to endure hardship with a spirit of sacrifice and self-reliance. The emphasis on spirit, seishin (semangat in Indonesian), was universally noted by all interviewees trained here as in other Japanese programs in Southeast Asia, whether military or civilian. Training was designed to produce physical courage and stamina.” (Page 106 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

“Two basic assumptions underlay Japanese military training programs, both in the Japanese Army and in the armies in Southeast Asia. One was that spirit, seishin, is more important than any technological advantage in military weaponry. The other was that self-discipline must be absolute, precluding any conflict with other values.” (Page 170 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

“The emphasis on spirit was designed to encourage heroism in battle when all technical military advantages might lie with the enemy. The discipline endurance and confidence thereby instilled were in all cases transferred to nascent armies in post-war Southeast Asia. In evaluation the legacy of Japanese training, the special emphasis on inculcating a fighting spirit, self-reliance and self-discipline cannot be overemphasized. The Japanese imparted to their Southeast Asian trainees the assumption that the elan of the warrior was far superior to his technical expertise and would enable him to overcome any obstacle. Detection of the seeds of this spirit among applicants for Japanese training programs, and fostering the spirit among trainees were mentioned by many Southeast Asians as the foremost feature of Japanese education, both military and civilian.” (Page 170 to 171 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

“Many Southeast Asians note today that they still feel the effects of this spiritual training, though the impact of the technical education was more ephemeral.” (Page 171 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)






The occupation “created a new class of elites who competed for influence and prestige with traditional elites. The most important of these emerging elites was without doubt the new military leadership reared by the Japanese army commands. While colonial armies had as a rule been drawn from ethnic minorities and officered by Westerners, the Japanese recruited and trained entire armies and officers' corps from among the major ethnic groups in Southeast Asia.” (Page 325 of Japan Examined)

Other changes in Indonesia

The Japanese “appointed indigenous people to administrative posts to replace Europeans.” (Page 328 of Japan Examined)

“Though their participation in central and local administrations was limited, they acquired skills of administering government. This knowledge proved useful in postindependence years.” (Page 328 of Japan Examined)

“Indonesia is a multilingual nation consisting of more than three thousand islands sprawling over three thousand square miles. Before the war there was no common language except Dutch, the lingua franca of the educated. The mass of the populace spoke in dialects and the people had no self-identity as Indonesians. During the Japanese interregnum, Indonesian became the national language due to Japanese encouragement and a ban on Dutch.” (Page 329 of Japan Examined)

Sukarno “could not have united the nation in postwar years so effectively without Japan's language policy.” (Page 329 of Japan Examined)

Had Japan wanted to annex Indonesia, they would have made Japanese the official language of Indonesia during the occupation.

The Indian National Army

“The India project was part of a secret war which would be fought chiefly with the weapons of propaganda and espionage. Under Iwakuro Japanese-sponsored intelligence schools burgeoned throughout Southeast Asia, training Indians for infiltration behind enemy lines.” (Kindle Locations 4958-4960 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

“Japan’s aim in aiding the INA remained to foster anti-British sentiment. All Japanese policy decisions regarding the INA pointed toward this goal. The major Japanese thrust throughout the war was to encourage proliferation of Indian intelligence activities throughout Southeast Asia. Even during the Imphal campaign and the engagements in Burma, the Japanese Army was reluctant to see the INA evolve into a large fighting force.” (Kindle Locations 4999-5002 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

Fujiwara spoke before 45,000 Indian POWs. (Kindle Location 735 from The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

He declared “that Japan was waging its war in order to liberate Asia from Western colonialism. He assured his audience that Japan had no designs on India.” (Kindle Locations 737 from The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

The revolution begins

In all, Japan trained 353,000 soldiers in Southeast Asia. (Page 325 of Japan Examined)

“All the self-confidence, military training, and political expertise which had been acquired in the Japanese interregnum were now mobilized against attempts at reassertion of Western colonial rule. Under Japanese occupation nationalism and aspirations for independence had been stimulated to a point of no return.” (Page 183 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

“Southeast Asians emerged from the war equipped with military arms and training, political and organizational experience and skills, and a firm and irrevocable ideological commitment to independence.” (Page 183 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

“They would lead their awakened peoples against a return to colonial servitude,” said Stephen Mercado. “Throughout Asia, the war had fanned the embers of nationalism into unquenchable fires.” (Kindle Location 50 from The Shadow Warriors of Nakano)

“In Atjeh State, for example, members of Pusa killed many of the uleebalang, the aristocratic class through whom the Dutch had ruled the States of Atjeh.” (Page 133 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia)

The New York Times

A few months after the official end to World War II, the New York Times published perhaps the most extraordinary editorial in their 163 years of existence. Despite the official surrender of the Japanese military on August 15, the war did not end on that day, a fact for which the Times blamed Japan. There is “cumulative evidence,” they declared, “that at least part of the trouble in the Orient is being caused by Japanese treachery and by violation of the surrender terms.”

Under the terms of their surrender, Japan was to hand over all their “military equipment and civil property.”

“But it is now confirmed that, in violation of these terms and the command of their own Emperor, the local Japanese commanders have been turning over arms and equipment to the Indonesian and Indo-Chinese revolutionaries and to the Chinese Communists,” said the Times. “They have planted agents of unrest throughout the Far East, trained in special Japanese treason schools to propagate in underground warfare the same aims Japan sought to gain in the war she lost. They are furnishing military leadership and even men to native groups fighting the Allies. And in the Indies they even created, five days after their surrender, an ‘Indonesian Republic.’”

“But the most explosive situation exists in China, where the end of the war and Japanese arms turned over to them have inspired in the Chinese Communists even greater resistance to the recognized Government of their country than they displayed in the past. The Communists are not only delaying the disarmament and dissolution of the Japanese armies on Chinese soil but are also raising the specter of civil war, which could set all Asia aflame again.”

A few months later, the Times published another article in which they accused Japan of leaving behind in Asia “a legacy of hate and of ideas that promise to keep East Asia in a ferment for decades, perhaps a century.”

“Even more important than the physical damage done by the soldiers of the Emperor are the ideas that were planted,” said the Times. “The Japanese dropped an atomic bomb of nationalism in a stagnant pool of a billion Asiatics.”

“It is a bomb whose chain reaction promises to be as obliterative of the old order as was the uranium fission which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki”

In this article, the Times included a history of European colonialism in Asia, including how they managed to subjugate the people who lived there. Before the Europeans arrived, the region was full of “ancient tribes and kingdoms that warred on each other, had no common language, and until recently had little communication with each other.”

“It was isolationism and factionalism that the colonial powers took advantage of, and encouraged,” said the Times. “The policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ that Hitler adopted in Europe was practiced everywhere in the Far Eastern colonies. Colonial troops from one section of a country were seldom brigaded together. In suppressing internal disorders, native troops were never used in their own province, always in some distant part of the country. Ancient tribal customs that would distinguish one area from another were encouraged.”

“Conflicting religions also were encouraged.”

“When the Japanese came they made three important changes. First, they exploded the myth of military and social invulnerability of the ‘pukkah sahibs’ and ‘tuan besars.’ They overwhelmed their military forces in short order and then subjected white prisoners to every form of indignity and encouraged former servants of the white man to do likewise.”

“Second, they inaugurated a propaganda campaign that has been eagerly continued by nationalist leaders. Knowing the people could not read, the Japanese set up radio stations and established outdoor radio receiving units in practically every village. Thus millions who could not be reached through the eye were reached through the ear.”

“That the colonial peoples of the Far East intend to have their freedom, and that they eventually will win it, there is little doubt. Their numbers are many times those of the white man. And for the first time in their history-thanks largely to the Japanese-they have modern arms with which to fight. None of them is so well armed as are the forces of the colonial powers, but they make up in numbers and in fanatical fervor what they lack in modern artillery and planes. And they are united. A few bands of irregulars-which is how some colonial diehards describe the revolutionary armies-could not paralyze the economy of half of Asia unless they had the support of the majority of the people.”

“Whatever the outcome of these present days of turmoil and transition, the Far East in all probability will never again be the happy hunting ground of European imperialists and the predatory white business man.”

References:

The New York Times accuses Japan of violating the terms of surrender and fomenting revolution in Asia:
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1945/11/17/88312809.html

The other articles published by the New York Times, which includes a history of European colonialism in the Far East and how Japan stirred the people of the region to revolution:
query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=990CE3DF133EEE3BBC4153DFB466838C659EDE

Indonesia

“Confusion and terror reign and, outside protected areas, no life is safe” regardless of which flag they wave. The Dutch flag “offers more menace than protection.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1945/11/18/109348256.html)

“The Indonesians admit they cannot guarantee tranquillity anywhere so long as the hated Dutch are in evidence,” wrote the New York Times on November 17.

“the Dutch have given them nothing for the enormous wealth in gasoline and tropical products they have taken from the country-nothing except repressive taxation, clumsy administration, tyrannous and bureaucratic control of commerce and industry and neglected education.”

“The Dutch attribute the institution of the republic directly to Japan, but they admit they cannot hope to restore the old order by force of arms. A new phase has begun. The Indonesians are consumed by a longing for liberty and independence. They won’t be stopped.”

“Rigid restrictions were placed on Japanese troops said by the British to have helped to instigate the Indonesian violence,” said the New York Times. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/02/23/93056907.html)

Vietnam

On August 25, 1945, Bao Dai abdicated and Japan transferred all power to the Viet Minh. (Page 133 of Tradition, Revolution, and Market Economy in a North Vietnamese Village) On September 2, 1945, the same day that Japan signed the formal instrument of surrender, Ho Chi Minh read the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. (www.unc.edu/courses/2009fall/hist/140/006/Documents/VietnameseDocs.pdf)

“for more than eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our Fatherland and oppressed our fellow-citizens,” he said.

“they have drowned our uprisings in rivers of blood.”

“They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials.”

“Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the Fatherland.”

“we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the whole Vietnamese people, declare that from now on we break off all relations of a colonial character with France; we repeal all the international obligation that France has so far subscribed to on behalf of Vietnam and we abolish all the special rights the French have unlawfully acquired in our Fatherland.”

“The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are determined to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists to reconquer their country.”

“we, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly declare to the world that Vietnam has the right to be a free and independent country”

“The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilise all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty.”


In Vietnam, “the Japanese armed 60,000 Annamites in Saigon with machine-guns, rifles, revolvers, daggers and bamboo clubs and encouraged them to strike for independence from French rule.” (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20F1FFE3B55177A93CBA91782D85F418485F9)

“the French regarded the trouble as ‘all Jap-inspired.’” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1945/09/26/issue.html)

When the war ended, “the Japanese secret police of more than 1,000 members … switched their uniforms for civilian clothing and, as Indo-Chinese ‘merchants’ were aiding the Annemese in their rebellion against restoration of French rule.” (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F00A15FF3D5E1B7B93C0A9178BD95F418485F9)

Freedom for India

The British tried members of the INA on November 5. (Kindle Location 4711 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

On trial were three members of the INA, one of which was Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon. (Kindle Location 4725 from The Indian National Army and Japan) Fujiwara was called to testify at their trial. He asked for, and was given, some potassium cyanide for which he intended on using to kill himself. But at the last moment, he decided against consuming the poison. (Kindle Location 4829 from The Indian National Army and Japan) Turned out to be a good decision.

“Will the trial go well?” he asked. (Kindle Location 4847 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

“Don’t worry,” said Dhillon. “India will gain independence within a year. If they punish any one of us no Englishman will leave India alive.” (Kindle Locations 4847 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

These remarks were spoken right in front of a British officer, who upon hearing those words, said nothing. That the Dhillon felt comfortable telling Fujiwara this information in front of the British indicates that the outcome of the trial, and the future of India, had already been decided. Indeed India was granted independence, though the timetable was slightly more drawn out. But only slightly. India was granted independence on August 15, 1947, about eight months after the predicted deadline.

The vice-minister for foreign affairs, Matsumoto, at the trial, said Japan supported the INA “to help India achieve independence, which was … one of Japan’s war aims.” (Kindle Location 4795 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

Hundreds of thousands of Indians protested the trials. (Kindle Location 4871 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

The protests continued to grow after the trial. The Indian Navy revolted against the British.

“If there were any Englishmen who still doubted the questionable loyalty of the Indian services, they were now convinced.” (Kindle Locations 4883 from The Indian National Army and Japan)

Full tide

“Instead of ebbing, post-war ferment in the Far East still rises toward full tide. In India, Burma, Indo-China and China it is boiling over. It stirs half the population of the earth.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/12/22/95801057.html)

The French continue to fight the Viet Minh.

“But it is a hopeless war.”

“All nations, East and West, recognize that the colonial era in Asia is over forever.”

“The world regards this mounting Asiatic ferment with somber premonition.”

January 1949 in Vietnam

“the French were fighting not only the Viet-Minh rebels but also an estimated 10,000 Japanese soldiers left behind after the occupation.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/01/03/84184670.html)

The final battle for independence in Indonesia

The Japanese military continued to fight alongside the Indonesians until the very end. Three years after Japan’s official surrender, towards the end of 1948, “two of the four Dutch planes lost in the fighting had been shot down by ‘an anti-aircraft battery manned by about thirty Japanese.’” (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D01EED7123FEE32A2575AC2A9649D946993D6CF)

“The latest Dutch ‘police action’ in Java and Sumatra, besides darkening the outlook for a durable settlement here, appears to have done perhaps irreparable damage to the stability of all Asian colonial areas. In addition, it has resulted in an immediate strengthening of the Communist line, not only here internationally.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/01/10/85322894.html)

“Among colonials themselves-the British in Malaya and the Dutch in Indonesia-there is much huffing and puffing and whistling in the dark that seems almost unreal to anyone who has been in slight contact with the boiling cauldrons of non-white opinion in Southeast Asia.”

China


Wang Ming: the Chinese version of Kim Il-sung

Like in Korea, the Russians tried to install their stooges at the top of the Communist Party of China. Like in Korea, the Russians wanted the Chinese Communists to define themselves by their opposition to Japan.

Stalin “wanted the Chinese Reds to fight Japan, and to get his policy enforced he flew his most loyal Chinese acolyte to Yenan in a special plane in November 1937. This was Wang Ming” (Kindle Locations 4250-4251 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Russians gave Wang two slogans, slogans which they wanted the Chinese Communists to adopt and implement. The slogans were: “Subordinate everything to the national anti-Japanese united front” and “Everything through the national anti-Japanese united front.” Wang faithfully transmitted these slogans to the Chinese Communist leadership in December, but the party never really implemented these policies. (Page 91 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Rather than allow the Russians to take over the party, the Chinese Communists made Mao Zedong their leader.

“Mao could count on overwhelming support from the old guard of the party, who looked upon the returned students as upstarts whose unwarranted rise to power had been imposed on the CCP by the Soviets.” (Page 92 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Under Mao's leadership, the Chinese Communists generally avoided fighting the Japanese military.

“It is not a good idea … to undertake large-scale action,” said Mao. “Our armies are weak. Action will inevitably do irreparable damage.” (Kindle Locations 4885-4886 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Mao’s refusal to help infuriated Moscow” (Kindle Locations 4897-4898 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

His refusal also infuriated their stooge, Wang Ming, who wrote a cable to Stalin which accused Mao of committing “many crimes.” These crimes were both “anti-Soviet and anti-Party.” (Kindle Location 5267 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Mao had no personal affection for Moscow. Throughout his time in power, Mao was only interested in trying to get the most he could out of the Russians, while giving them as little in return as possible.

Mao said that any cooperation with Russia should be purely “strategic [i.e., in name only].” (Kindle Location 4888 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Unlike in Korea, where the Russians were able to install their stooges, in China, their stooges were marginalized. Wang Ming was eventually sent back to Russia where he lived out the remainder of his years. He “died in exile in Moscow” (Kindle Location 5226 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Chinese Communists recruit members of the Japanese Imperial Army

Not only did the Chinese Communists avoid fighting Japan, from the start of the war they tried to recruit members of the Japanese Imperial Army to join them.

Two months after the war began, the Chinese Communists “issued two proclamations.” (Page 133 of The Thought War)

“The first announced that Japanese soldiers were farmers and laborers just like the Chinese”

“The second message … stated that the Chinese and Japanese were friends.” The Chinese Communists “welcomed Japanese soldiers to come over to the Chinese side and work for the Chinese war effort.”

“The achievements of the Chinese Communist propaganda aimed at the Japanese military proved so nimble that it stunned US authorities.” (Page 120 of The Thought War)

The Chinese Communists “implemented a policy of treating Japanese POWs well, thereby hoping to encourage Japanese soldiers to flee to their side.” (Page 128 of The Thought War)

“Japanese POWs were well cared for, fed, provided with a little spending money, and given literature in Chinese to read.” (Page 134 of The Thought War)

The Chinese Communists created a school “to reeducate Japanese POWs.” (Page 134 of The Thought War) The school was run by two men, one Japanese (Sanzō Nosaka), and one Chinese (Wang Xuewen). Wang himself had studied in Japan long before the school was founded.

“Wang had traveled to Japan in 1910 and studied economics at Kyoto Imperial University.”

Though the Japanese were more than eager to interact with the Chinese Communists, they avoided the Russians like the plague.

“In Manchuria, near the end of the war, Japanese military and civilians alike studiously avoided, insofar as possible, surrendering to the Soviets.” (Page 133 of The Thought War)

The Japanese military fights the Nationalists, not the Communists

Throughout the war, the Japanese military focused almost exclusively on destroying the Nationalists and left the Chinese Communists practically untouched.

“the Japanese war plan for 1942 aimed at defeating the KMT army, not the Eighth Route Army.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

(KMT is an abbreviation for the Nationalists. The Eight Route Army was the primary military force for the Chinese Communists.)

For the Japanese military, “the central issue for the solution of the China incident lies in the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek's resistance against Japan.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

During the war, the Nationalists “fought all the major positional battles against the Japanese” (Page 297 of China’s Bitter Victory) The fighting took a heavy toll on the Nationalists, particularly on their best soldiers.

“from the beginning of the war Chiang employed his very best troops, and they suffered the most severe casualties throughout the fighting.” (Page 298 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Chinese Communists fared much during the war.

“while more than ten divisions of KMT troops in the Chungt'iao mountains in southern Shansi north of the Yellow River were easily vanquished by the Japanese, the Eighth Route Army not only survived but succeeded in forging itself into a force eventually strong enough to challenge successfully the supremacy of the KMT in China.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Mao's plan

Mao told his comrades that Chiang Kai-shek “was their ultimate enemy, and that they must start now preparing to seize power from him.” (Kindle Locations 4450-4451 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“His plan was to ride on the coat-tails of the Japanese to expand Red territory.” (Kindle Locations 4229-4230 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Chinese Communists waited “for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, as the Japanese swept on,” Mao had his soldiers “seize territories behind the Japanese lines.” (Kindle Locations 4226-4227 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The more land Japan took, the better,” Mao said. (Kindle Location 4233 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Japanese military and the Communist New 4th Army (N4A) secretly agreed to leave each other alone.

“For years, Japanese trains ran smoothly, and the N4A expanded quietly.” (Kindle Locations 4591-4595 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

In the first stage of the war, which lasted a little over a year, the Japanese military inflicted heavy losses on the Nationalists. In the second stage of the war, which began at the start of 1939, the Chinese Communists, realizing that the Nationalists were greatly diminished, began to seize territory from them.

“Large-scale engagements were fought behind Japanese lines between Communist and Nationalist forces over territory, in which the Communists usually came off best.” (Kindle Locations 4475-4477 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Not only did the Japanese military leave the Chinese Communists alone, in at least one instance, they fought along their side against the Nationalists.

“the Russian GRU chief in Yenan reported one occasion when Communist troops attacked Nationalist forces in Shandong in summer 1943 ‘in coordination with Japanese troops.’” (Kindle Location 4692 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Not only was Mao able to expand his party under the protection of the Japanese military, Mao was also able to expand his control of the party. In 1942, he launched his Rectification Campaign (cheng-feng) which effectively eliminated all external influence from the party, whether that influence came in the form of Nationalist or Russian spies. All of Mao's enemies were either killed or terrorized into submission.

“Over the period from the beginning of cheng-feng to the convening of the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, the CCP was transformed from an offspring of Soviet communism to an independent Chinese Communist movement led by Mao.” (Page 94 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The secret collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Japanese military did not go unnoticed in Moscow.

“Stalin had been nursing suspicions that Mao might be ‘a Japanese agent.’” (Kindle Locations 4311-4312 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

In reality, the reason the Chinese Communists collaborated with Japan was best encapsulated in a phrase they used at the time, “Use the hand of the enemy to strike the other enemy.”

We “used the knives of the Japanese to slaughter Nationalists,” said one Chinese Communist intelligence agent. “The Japanese annihilation of the [Nationalist underground army] south of the Yangtze [was one of the] masterpieces of cooperation between the Japanese and our Party.” (Kindle Locations 4583-4588 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Collaboration with Japanese intelligence

As the quote suggests, the collaboration between Japan and the Chinese Communists included their intelligence officials.

“in September 1939 Mao initiated a long, close and little-known collaboration with Japanese intelligence, in the hope of further sabotaging Chiang—and preserving his own forces.” (Kindle Locations 4570-4574 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

On the Chinese side, the operation was run by Pan Han-nian. His counterpart from Japan was Eiichi Iwai, a senior intelligence officer and the Japanese vice-consul in Shanghai.

“Pan supplied Iwai with information about Chiang’s ability to resist the Japanese, his conflicts with the CCP and his relations with foreign powers, as well as about US and British agents in Hong Kong and Chongqing. This intelligence rated high with the Japanese: one item reportedly sent the Japanese ambassador to China ‘wild with joy.’” (Kindle Locations 4576-4582 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Nationalists emerge from the war in poor shape

“the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek emerged victorious, but in such a gravely weakened condition that it was soon defeated by the Chinese Communist party in the ensuing civil conflict.” (Page 295 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Communists emerge from the war much better off than before

“the fortunes of the CCP were greatly bolstered during the course of the war.” (Page 296 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Their army, “a mere 40,000 men as of 1937, grew to over a million men in 1945. The population of the Communist-controlled areas increased from 1.5 million to over 100 million, and the original territory of 92,000 square kilometers expanded to 950,000 square kilometers in nineteen resistance bases.” (Page 79 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Japanese military paved the way for the Chinese Communists to seize power in 1949.

“Mao Tse-tung himself quite openly admitted this in 1964, when he brushed off the attempted apologies of a group of Japanese socialists who were visiting Peking and acknowledged that the Sino-Japanese War had been his path to power.” (Page 297 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Japanese weapons for the Chinese Communists

The Japanese military continued to play a pivotal role in China after the war officially ended.

“the entire issue of to whom and under what circumstances the Japanese forces would surrender had significant impact on the outcome of the Chinese civil war that followed Japan’s withdrawal.” (Page 138 of The Thought War)

“The United States wanted to disarm Japan and repatriate everyone as soon as possible, but the Chinese Communists wanted to obtain the weapons the Japanese were supposed to surrender.” (Page 137 of The Thought War)

Tang Enbo, the man in charge of Nationalist forces in Shanghai, declared that “instead of turning all of their weapons over to” him in accordance with the surrender agreements, “the Japanese military in Shanghai secretly were sending them to the Chinese Communists.” (Page 515 of Staying On)

In Manchuria, the Japanese Kwantung Army surrendered to the Russians a gigantic arsenal which the Russians, in turn, promptly handed over to the Chinese Communists.

This “included 7,000 rifles, 11,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy machine guns, 1,800 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,500 mortars and grenade launchers, 700 tanks, and nearly 900 airplanes, as well as 800 supply dumps and ammunition depots, and a flotilla of warships on the Sungari river in northern Manchuria.” (Page 514 of Staying On)

“The result was a twofold increase in the number of rifles and automatic weapons in the possession of the Communists, a threefold increase in their artillery, and a more than twentyfold increase in the ammunition available to them.” (Page 514 of Staying On)

All this firepower, however, would have been worthless unless someone trained the Chinese Communists in the proper maintenance and use of the equipment. Here too, the Japanese Imperial Army came to the rescue.

“the Russians secretly transferred tens of thousands of Japanese POWs to the CCP. These troops played a major role in turning the ragtag Communist army into a formidable battle machine, and were crucial in training Red forces to use the Japanese arms on which they chiefly depended, as well as for servicing and repairing these weapons. It was Japanese, too, who founded the CCP air force, with Japanese pilots serving as flight instructors. Thousands of well-trained Japanese medical staff brought the Red wounded a new level of professional and much-welcomed treatment. Some Japanese troops even took part in combat operations.” (Kindle Location 6094 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“These former Japanese troops were extremely useful to the Communists because their level of technical expertise was usually higher than that of other Communist soldiers. For example, in the battle for Tientsin in 1949, most of the artillery employed by the Communists was manned by Japanese gunners.” (Page 511 of Staying On)

Other postwar activities by the Japanese military

“American newsmen in Shanghai reported that in December 1945 there was functioning in that city a Japanese underground comprised on terrorists belonging to the Black Dragon Society and fanatical members of what had been Japanese military intelligence whose aim was to promote civil war in China” (Page 515 of Staying On)

“in many of the cities they occupied, the Japanese systematically wrecked scores of factories before the Americans had time to fly in Chiang Kai-shek’s troops” (Page 515 of Staying On)

America saves the Communists

Despite the extensive help given to them by the Japanese military, the Chinese Communists were not quite ready to confront the Nationalists when the war ended. They needed a few more months to prepare. If nothing else, they certainly needed to learn how to use all the new Japanese military equipment they just acquired. The Nationalists almost defeated them.

“Mao was on the ropes. Then he was rescued—by the Americans.” (Kindle Location 5982 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Right at that moment, George Marshall performed “a monumental service” for the Chinese Communists. He “put heavy—and decisive—pressure on Chiang to stop pursuing the Communists into northern Manchuria.” (Kindle Locations 6042-6044 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang agreed to a ceasefire right “when Mao had become resigned to abandoning” his last major city in Manchuria “and dispersing his army into guerrilla units.” (Kindle Locations 6049-6050 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Marshall’s diktat was probably the single most important decision affecting the outcome of the civil war. The Reds who experienced that period, from Lin Biao to army veterans, concurred in private that this truce was a fatal mistake on Chiang’s part. Had he pressed on, then at the very least he might have prevented the Reds establishing a large and secure base on the Soviet border, with rail links with Russia, over which huge amounts of heavy artillery were brought in.” (Kindle Location 6052 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The Founder of Chiang’s FBI, Chen Li-fu, told us that the Nationalists had no designs on Mao’s life ‘because the Americans guaranteed his safety.’” (Kindle Locations 5835-5836 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Russian aid

Unlike in Southeast Asia, where the West was blindsided by the independence movements fostered by Japan, in China, they actually wanted the Chinese Communists to defeat their former allies, the Nationalists. The West wanted to isolate China after the war to prevent the country from getting stronger. To do that, they too aided the Chinese Communists which helped them seize power. And then once the Chinese Communists seized power, the West loudly proclaimed that Communism was evil. Communist countries were evil. They should be dealt with harshly to prevent them from expanding their influence.

Even though the West would have preferred for Wang Ming to seize control of the Chinese Communist Party, they were content to allow Mao Zedong lead the party. For them, this was preferable to having the Nationalists destroy the Chinese Communists, as the West had no excuse for isolating the Nationalists. The Nationalists were, after all, the ones who just spent the previous eight years fighting Japan alongside the West.

The Russians provided extensive aid to the Chinese Communists.

“During the truce, the Russians opened at least sixteen major military institutions, including air force, artillery and engineering schools. Many Chinese officers went to Russia for training” (Kindle Location 6086 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“the Russians supervised the repair of more than 10,000 km of track and 120 major bridges. This railway system was critical in allowing the Communists to move vast numbers of troops, and heavy artillery, at speed, to attack the main cities that autumn.” (Kindle Location 6108 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

None of this aid came for free, however.

“A secret agreement was reached for the CCP to send Russia one million tons of food every year. The result was famine and deaths from starvation in some areas of China occupied by the Communists.” (Kindle Location 6118 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang the western stooge

Japan would have preferred to avoid China becoming isolated. Aside from the moral objections, the isolation of China eliminated an ever promising market for Japanese exports. In a perfect world, Japan would have opposed having the Communists taking control of China. But a perfect world did not exist in 1937. At that time, the most influential domestic force in China was the Nationalists, an organization run by Chiang Kai-shek. Like Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee, Chiang was the prototypical stooge of the West. Having him in charge of China was a disaster for Japan. They needed to find someone else. The only other option that the West would accept was the Chinese Communists. Japan made the best out of a bad situation and did what was necessary to bring them to power and to gain their favor.

That Chiang was the ultimate stooge of the West can be seen in the way he ran the civil war with the Communists after Japan surrendered. Were he not a stooge, he would have tried to win the war. He did not do that. Aside from agreeing to a ceasefire at the start of the civil war, Chiang had his forces implement a baffling set of policies during the war that ultimately guaranteed his defeat.

His primary mistake was his selection of commanders. He picked the worse possible officers. Once those officers proved their incompetence time and time and again, he refused to replace them. And to top it all off, after they failed completely and spectacularly, Chiang protected them from those who wanted to discipline them.

One of his generals was Hu Tsung-nan. Hu repeatedly isolated small groups of his soldiers from his main force. This allowed the Communists to swoop in and destroy those small groups one at a time.

“Chiang knew that Hu wrecked everything he touched.” (Kindle Location 6242 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang wrote that Hu was “following the same fatal road again and again.” (Kindle Location 6244 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“And yet, when Hu disingenuously offered his resignation, Chiang turned it down” (Kindle Location 6244 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Hu’s incompetence resulted in the deaths of “many hundreds of thousands of troops.” (Kindle Location 6261 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Once the Nationalists were banished to Taiwan, there was an effort to impeach Hu. But the effort “failed, thanks to Chiang’s protection.” (Kindle Locations 6262-6263 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang put Wei Li-huang in charge of his forces in Manchuria.

“Chiang had not only been told that Wei was a Communist agent, but actually suspected this to be true.” (Kindle Location 6268 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

One wonders why Chiang would knowingly make one of his enemies the commander of his forces.

“The reason Wei was brought back in 1948 and given such a crucial job was that Chiang was frantically trying to woo the Americans, who thought highly of Wei’s performance in Burma and regarded him as an important ‘liberal.’” (Kindle Location 6276 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

According to William Stokes, the former U.S. vice-consul in Shenyang, Chiang appointed Wei “in a futile attempt to gain more American equipment and funding, because Wei was recognized by the Americans as a proven military leader.” (Kindle Location 6278 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Wei was indeed a communist agent. His actions brought further disaster to the Nationalists. But rather than punish Wei for his actions, Chiang “let Wei go, and he sailed off unmolested to Hong Kong.” (Kindle Location 6289 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

That America made Chiang appoint a known Communist as the leader of his forces proves that America wanted the Communists to win the war. And it proves that, for Chiang, placating his American masters was his highest priority. And that makes him the ultimate stooge of the West.

Stalin conspires with the West to isolate China

After losing the civil war to the Communists, the Nationalists were banished to the island of Taiwan. The Chinese Communists wanted to invade Taiwan to destroy the Nationalists and complete their takeover of China. But the Russians refused to help them.

“Mao asked Stalin for Soviet-crewed planes and submarines to help take Taiwan in 1950 or ‘even earlier,’ telling Stalin that the CCP had a large number of well-placed moles who had ‘fled’ there with Chiang. Stalin, however, was not prepared to risk a direct confrontation with America in such a high-visibility, high-tension area, and Mao had to shelve his plan, allowing Chiang to turn Taiwan into an island stronghold.” (Kindle Locations 6567-6570 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

On the surface, Stalin's reasoning seems absurd. Why would America, after helping the Chinese Communists conquer over 99% of China, suddenly object to their conquering the last tiny bit? As long as the Nationalists remained alive, even if constrained to an insignificant area, that allowed the West to recognize the Nationalists as the one true government of China. This, in turn, allowed the West to monopolize the newly formed UN Security Council, where all five of the permanent members were white, except one. The sole exception was China. But China, at that time, was run by Chiang Kai-shek whom, as we have seen, was the ultimate western stooge, willing to do whatever the West desired. In effect, the West had complete control of the Security Council. However, were the Chinese Communists to obliterate the Nationalists, the West would either have to allow the Chinese Communists to join the Security Council, or simply reduce the number of permanent members to four. Neither option was appealing for them. Had they allowed the Chinese Communists into the Security Council, that would have ended their monopoly of power. Had they reduced the number of permanent members to four, the Council would have literally become a white's only club, which was something the West wanted to avoid.

Misc.

“We’ve been thinking of renaming our Party, of calling it not ‘Communist’ but something else,” said Mao. “Then the situation … will be more favorable, especially with the Americans” (Kindle Locations 6005-6007 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

General Carton de Wiart said that he did “not consider that [the Reds] contributed much towards defeating the Japs” (Kindle Locations 5850-5851 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The Soviet occupation forces carted off whole factories and machinery as ‘war booty,’ and even demolished industrial installations. The equipment removed by the Russians was estimated to be worth US $858 million (US $2 billion at current replacement cost).” (Kindle Locations 5818-5820 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“When Stalin dispatched General Chuikov as his new military adviser to Chongqing at this time, Chuikov asked why he was being sent ‘to Chiang Kai-shek, not the Chinese Red Army.’ Stalin answered: ‘Your job is firmly to tie the hands of the Japanese aggressor in China.’” (Kindle Locations 4674-4676 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Many of the CCP and KMT leaders had also studied in Japan and still held Japan in high esteem, even if they despised the current political and military regime. These Chinese had developed personal relations with individual Japanese in the course of their studies and research abroad. In addition, since 1895 many Chinese had, for better or worse, regarded Japan as a model of modernity. The small country provided a glimpse of the power China might achieve if it could successfully modernize.” (Page 154 of The Thought War)

“Mao never made any comment, then or later, about this,” (Kindle Locations 4273-4274 from Mao: The Unknown Story)