Korea

Add information from Mao: The Unknown Story
Read the article about Yan Xishan
Add the part about how America wanted Japan to do something about Vietnam


After the war, western influence declined in all countries throughout the Far East except one - Korea. Before the war, Korea was a Japanese colony. After the war, the West was determined to kill all Japanese influence there and replace it with their own. For whatever reason, unlike the other countries in East Asia, Japan decided against preventing the West from seizing control there. While I can't say with any certainty why Japan didn't put up more of a fight in Korea, I will venture a few guesses. Foremost among them, unlike in the other countries, in Korea, Japan was at a distinct disadvantage when it came to propaganda. In Southeast Asia, Japan could tell the inhabitants that they were there to liberate them from white people. In Korea, they couldn't do that. The reverse was true. The West could tell the Koreans that they were liberating them from the Japanese.

In Southeast Asia, Japan knew they could catch the West off guard. Japan likely figured that the West was not prepared for their liberation efforts there. And indeed, it appears that Japan caught the West completely by surprise. But in Korea, Japan knew that the West would try to seize control of the country after the war. They knew the West had several years to plan and prepare for the seizure of Korea which would make it more difficult to thwart their schemes.

Indeed the plan implemented by the West may have caught Japan off guard. Perhaps Japan did indeed, while the war was ongoing, desire to fight the West in Korea. But when he war ended, and the West unveiled its plan to seize control of Korea, perhaps Japan felt their plan for postwar Korea would not be effective against it.

The plan hatched by the West was to split Korea in half, with the Russian Communists in control of the north and America in control of the south. That the West always planned on partitioning the Korean peninsula has been revealed in now declassified State Department documents. Before the Yalta Conference, the State Department noted that “military occupation of Korea by any single power might have serious political repercussions.” (Page 19 of Cold War Frontiers) This shows that the State Department always wanted at least two powers to occupy different parts of the peninsula.

This may have surprised Japan. Perhaps Japan was expecting that the West would try to install one of their capitalist puppets in Korea. That is what happened in the south, but not the north. After the war, there was considerably more unrest in the south as compared to the north. Perhaps Japan tried to implement their countermeasures in the south but abandoned their plan in the north because the plan was meant to counter a capitalist puppet government there.

Japan may have figured that it would be immoral to try to launch an insurgency against the West in Korea without having a good chance of succeeding. Perhaps they felt the Korean people would be better off living under western rule than in a country engulfed in a civil war which might ultimately end in failure, as the West did have the propaganda advantage in Korea.

The Japanese expulsion from North Korea

“Soviet foreign policy reports … stress that the Soviets’ greatest fear in northeast Asia was a revitalized and remilitarized Japan.” (Kindle Locations 1132-1133 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“Japan must be forever excluded from Korea, since a Korea under Japanese rule would be a constant threat to the Far East of the USSR” (Kindle Locations 1135-1136 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“Immediately after taking over control of the region from the Japanese, the Soviets set up a system of ‘interim people’s committees’ to liquidate the remnants of Japanese rule. Although these committees were selected by the Soviets, they are composed entirely of Koreans.” (Page 4) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

“In one town a successful ‘self-rule council’; created after the Japanese surrender, was forcibly replaced by the Soviet commander with a ‘people’s political committee’ in which Korean communists were given the dominant position although they are only a very small minority of the people,” said General Hodge. (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-14.pdf)

To further eliminate Japanese influence from North Korea, immediately after Japan surrendered, Russia began forcing all the Japanese who lived there, and all their Korean allies, to leave the North and walk to South Korea.

“The Russian occupation is forcing thousands of Koreans and Japanese to trek south to the American Zone,” said one Australian official. (Page 3) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

Less than a month after the formal surrender of Japan, that Australian official took a tour of North Korea. During his stay, he saw how the Russians were forcing the Japanese to leave the North and move to South Korea. The Russians apparently talked to all the people who lived in North Korea and asked them what they thought of Russia.

“In several cases I checked I was able to ascertain that where the person said he was not pro Russia, either by actual statement or inference, he was ejected from his house forthwith and told to go south,” he said. (Page 8) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

“I saw Korean Communists, with two Russians for support, ask a korean if he was anti Communist. When he denied having anything to do with Communists he was seized and searched, his money was taken from him, and he was ordered out of Kanko.” (Page 8) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

“In all cases I was able to check the Russians had played an active part.” (Page 8) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

“On one occasion I asked, and was allowed to accompany, a looting party. The procedure as this: The Russians, armed with tommy guns, would drive up to a Korean or Japanese house, fire a few shot in the air, then break into the house, drag out what women (mostly young girls) they could find, put them into the truck along with the furniture and any other articles that caught their eyes, and drive off to their barracks. After a day or two the girls are thrown on the street.” (Page 3) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

“All along the line, from Kanko to the American lines, there is a stream of Korean and Jap refugees trekking south. A few I interviewed said they were escaping from the Russians who they feared. Their one desire was to get to American occupied Korea. I saw this line just out of Kanko, I saw it coming into Kano from the manchurian border, and I saw it entering the American Zone, some 200 miles to the south. I don’t suggest that the line stretches that distance without a break, but it is significant.” (Page 10) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

Just in case there were still Koreans loyal to Japan after the expulsion, Russia took away their property to make sure they would become powerless in the new state.

“Korean and Japanese landowners have been liquidated as a class,” and the Central Intelligence Group, in the beginning of 1947. (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

Their property was given to peasants, people who undoubtedly did not have fond memories of the Japanese occupation of Korea.

“The goals of land reform were to break the power of the landowning classes and eliminate Japanese collaborators, said Charles K. Armstrong. (Kindle Locations 2010 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“What is most remarkable about the reform is the speed with which it was carried out and the lack of bloodshed.” (Kindle Locations 2115 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

The Soviets assumed that any official who worked in the judicial system in North Korea was a Japanese collaborator.

“Since most current judges, police, and lawyers are pro-Japanese national traitors and oppose national construction, a non-Japanese judiciary has been constructed,” said one North Korean document. (Kindle Locations 5208 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

At the end of 1946, the North Korean government decided to expropriate “all hot springs, parks, beaches, etc. that had been owned by the Japanese state, Japanese organizations, Japanese people, and pro-Japanese national traitors.” (Kindle Locations 2284 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

No Japanese resistance in North Korea

Unlike the Japanese in Southeast Asia, the Japanese who lived in North Korea, from what I can tell, put up no fight whatsoever. They simply left for South Korea.

“The Japs are quiescent; they have no arms with which to fight anyway,” said the Australian official. (Page 10) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-13.pdf)

The “transition to a communist regime faithful to Moscow proceeded smoothly.” (Page 21 of Cold War Frontiers)

Eliminating Japanese influence from South Korea

“In contrast to the Soviet discipline of North Korea, South Korea is in a state of unrest.”

The blame for the unrest lay mostly with the policies adopted by the U.S. government. At the start of the American occupation of South Korea, the U.S. purged the Japanese officials who worked in the Korean government. This threw the Korean government into a state of turmoil, as there were no qualified Koreans to assume many of the positions held by Japanese officials.

“Since the Japanese had held all positions of importance in Korea for the past 40 years, and, because the policy of Military Government excluded the use of the few Koreans who had held high positions under the Japanese, the number of eligible applicants for Government positions who had any qualifications as government administrators were extremely limited.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-11.pdf)

“It was imperative in the beginning for Military Government to relieve all Japanese officials in Korea as rapidly as possible, and send them back to Japan. This meant actually the selection of thousands of untrained, inexperienced Koreans -- on a temporary trial basis in less than six months -- to staff one of the most complex governmental structures in the world” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-11.pdf)

“many mistakes and unwise selections were made by hurriedly replacing all Japanese officials by Koreans” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-11.pdf)

The U.S. government knew that their program of quickly replacing all Japanese officials in South Korea would throw the Korean government, indeed the entire country, into a state of turmoil. But they did not want to be seen as being responsible for this. To hide their responsibility, they had journalists work with Korean radicals to demand the replacement of the existing government (newspaper journalists who cover foreign affairs are notorious for secretly working with intelligence agencies).

“The newspaper correspondents covering Korea as a group have behaved badly. They arrived by air after our landing, most of them from Japan with no knowledge of the local situation and without orientation took advantage of the American uniform to run rampant over the area, committing acts of personal misbehavior that troops have been forbidden to do. There is reason to believe that by open sympathies with Korean radicals some of them have incited Korean group leaders to greater efforts at agitation for overthrow of everything and to have the Koreans take over all functions immediately.” (Page 5 to 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-15.pdf)

There was a food shortage during the American occupation of South Korea.

“The food shortage is the chief cause of unrest,” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

This was a problem that, one would think, the U.S. government should have been able to solve without too much difficulty. Korea is not a very big country, a fact which does not go unnoticed by its people, who often refer to their country as a shrimp caught between two whales, China and Japan. One would think America, at that time by far the wealthiest country on this planet, could have found the food to feed a shrimp. America would not even have had to feed an entire shrimp, only half a shrimp, as the Soviets controlled the northern half of the country. Actually, America would not have even had to feed half a shrimp, as South Korea was able to produce food, just not enough food to adequately feed its entire population. Nevertheless, America shipments of food to South Korea were far short of the amount necessary to placate the population.

“Grain shipments from the US during August and September were 25% short of minimum requirements. Under these conditions the price of black market rice has soared beyond the reach of the average consumer.” (Page 7) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

Food was not the only necessity in short supply during the occupation. American authorities seemed not particularly interested in making sure that adequate supplies of anything were sent to Korea. We apparently cut off sending supplies for a while.

“The economic condition of Korea is growing steadily worse, with no hope of any great betterment until shipments under the civilian supply program are resumed.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-8.pdf)

The document does not say when the shipments were stopped, nor what they consisted of, nor why they were stopped. Nor does it say when they would be resumed. But for whatever reason, we stopped sending supplies to South Korea for a while and this had a very negative effect on Korea.

Another fixable impediment was the transportation system which was inadequate. Yet we seemed to have little interest, or at least little urgency, in improving it.

“Additional motive power, long under negotiation but not yet arrived will go far to alleviate what may become the most critical single economic factor.” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-8.pdf)

Had we really wanted to improve things in South Korea, we would have finished the negotiations quickly. That we did not, shows that we wanted the economic situation to remain poor.

The recovery of South Korea was further delayed by the refusal of the U.S. government to quickly determine which agency should run the program to rehabilitate South Korea.

“The determination of the proper agency in which to lodge responsibility for the rehabilitation program for Korea should be made as quickly as possible.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-1-12.pdf)

“Each of the three agencies concerned thinks that the administration of the program should be lodged with one of the other two.” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-1-12.pdf)

That those three agencies each claimed to refuse to administer the program suggests that the U.S. government intentionally wanted to delay the program. Had we really wanted to launch the program quickly, someone from above would have just picked one of the agencies and ordered them to run the program.

On several issues, then, the U.S. government consistently delayed the recovery of the South Korean economy. This delay was almost certainly intentional. The delay caused unrest throughout the country. The general unhappiness throughout South Korea provided fertile ground for Soviet efforts to foment unrest throughout the country.

“the well organized Communist opponents of the US occupation are endeavoring to give political direction to the current disorders, which Soviet propaganda represents as a protest against the interim US policy in Korea.” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

Russia foments unrest in South Korea

“the Communists have apparently embarked on a campaign of terrorism against the occupation.” (Page 8) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

This campaign was controlled by Russia.

“The Communists in South Korea are under the direct control of Soviet agents in North Korea.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

The Communist reign of terror in South Korea was encouraged by the American occupation authorities.

“Korean resistance to the US occupation has been encouraged by the leniency of US policy. Economic discontent has been converted into political unrest by the opponents of the Military Government in South Korea who calculated on the toleration of the US authorities.” (Page 7) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

“The influence of the leftists in the US Zone derives more from skillful maneuvering and the desire of Military Government to appear impartial, than from popular support. As the administration passes into the hands of native Koreans, therefore, the leftists will presumably lose ground provided US forces can maintain order.” (Page 10) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

Indeed, as predicted, once the UN created the Republic of Korea in South Korea on August 15, 1948, the government began a crackdown on the Communists.

“The anti-Communist program undertaken by the Republic of Korea, since its inauguration in August 1948, has forced many Communist leaders to flee to the North.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

“All Communist activity was officially outlawed with the passage of the Law on the Nation’s Public Peace in November 1948.” (Page 3) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

That America would allow the Communists to run wild in South Korea for a few years only to impose a massive crackdown when power was transferred, begs the question - why did we do things this way.

There were at least three reasons. The first had to do with eliminating Communist influence by allowing the Russians to make fools of themselves which would turn the people of South Korea against Communism.

“Communist prestige, based on their leadership of Nationalist resistance to the Japanese, was highest at the time of liberation. In the absence of other political leadership, the Communists were able to assume leadership of the grass-roots independence movement which found expression in the establishment of the People’s Committees throughout Korea in August 1945. In the following months, however, the Communists, by espousing USSR rather than Nationalist objectives, dissipated a substantial portion of their prestige and incurred the enmity of significant groups of the population.” (Page 3) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

"The Communist Party in South Korea had substantial support," said Chong-sik Lee. "Actually between 1945 and 1946 or even 1947 the Communist Party, I believe, was the best organized political force in South Korea. Had the Communist Party in South Korea played their cards well, South Korea probably would have been taken over by the Communist Party. They were too radical." (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wJw8RYekEA&t=1m33s)

That the Russian would behave so stupidly in South Korea and turn public opinion against them, that America would allow the Russians to behave that way, indicates the Russians and Americans were conspiring together to split Korea in half. They worked together to discredit the Communists in the south. And they made sure that there would be no resistance to the Communization of the north.

Though the American authorities tried to maintain an appearance of toleration towards Communism, in reality, many Communists were executed.

“Although membership in the Communist Party or its front organization was technically legal during the period of American Military Government, the police generally regarded the Communists as rebels and traitors who should be seized, imprisoned, and sometimes shot on the slightest provocation.” (Page 3) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

The apparent toleration towards Communism was a form of bait which drew the Communists out of hiding, allowing the occupation authorities to identify them and eliminate them.

The other reason had to do with eliminating Japanese influence in South Korea.

Postwar Japanese activity in Korea

Part of the reason why the Soviets and Americans incited the people of South Korea to revolt was because that gave the U.S. government a pretext to kill Koreans aligned with Japan. Although Japan did not put up much of a fight in a South Korea after the war, they put up more of a fight there than they did in North Korea. Without saying it directly, declassified U.S. government documents blame Japan for at least some of the instability in South Korea after the war.

“it would greatly assist the occupation to transport the Japanese Army home at an early date” (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-15.pdf)

“Nothing approaching stable conditions in Korea can be established until the Japanese Army and most of the Japanese population have been removed to Japan.” (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-15.pdf)

The document noted the importance of moving the Japanese in Korea to Japan, and the importance of moving the Koreans in Japan to Korea.

“the exchange” of Koreans and Japanese “does reduce the capacity in each area for making trouble.” (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-6-15.pdf)

“The island of Cheju-Do has long been a center of guerrilla strength and activity. Police brutality, the venality of public officials, and the historic clannishness of the islanders contribute to the discontent which trained Communists have fanned into chronic revolt.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

The weapons used by the guerrillas make it sound like those guerrillas were trained by the Japanese military.

“The South Korean guerrillas are estimated to have about half their forces armed only with bamboo spears and the rest with Japanese rifles or carbines and M-1’s captured from security forces or contributed by mutineers.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

Their weapons sound identical to those used by the liberation forces Japan supported in Southeast Asia, which implies that the guerrillas in South Korea were supported by the Japanese military as well.

Five months before the end of the U.S. occupation in South Korea, in April 1948, America imposed “a brutal crackdown on what was perceived to be a Communist-led or at least Communist-inspired revolt” on Jeju Island. (Kindle Location 357 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent) (Jeju Island and Cheju-Do are two names for the same place. Older documents refer to the island as Cheju-Do. Today the name of the island is commonly written in English as Jeju Island). At least 30,000 people were killed.

“Soldiers and police from elsewhere descended on the island, wiping out entire villages as they fought to kill off any signs of leftist revolt against central government control,” said Donald Kirk. (Kindle Locations 359 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent)

Kim Kwan-ho, an official with the Association of Bereaved Families, “is convinced the U.S. occupation forces were behind the massacre.” (Kindle Location 2554 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent)

“The U.S. military was ruling the country so there’s no doubt the massacre was ordered by the U.S. military,” he said. (Kindle Locations 2554-2555 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent)

Though the massacre is identified as 4/3, the violence was not limited to a single day. In one case, a “whole village was killed in January 1949 after the government of President Rhee Seung-man was established.” (Kindle Locations 2556-2557 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent)

Though he doesn’t directly say that the massacre was a U.S. government effort to eliminate Koreans aligned with Japan, Donald Kirk strongly hints that such a motivation was behind the massacre.

“The history of the Jeju revolt goes back to the response against Japanese rule among intellectuals imbued with radical if not revolutionary ideas picked up not from North Korea but from studies in Japan,” said Donald Kirk. “When they returned to Jeju in the confused aftermath of Japanese surrender, reunification of North and South was their dream as it was for millions of Koreans elsewhere.” (Kindle Locations 2568-2570 from Okinawa and Jeju: Bases of Discontent)

It appears that guerrilla activity in South Korea died down after the American occupation ended.

“Recently, indiscriminate guerrilla activity against villages has caused many formerly sympathetic civilians to assist security forces in combing the hills, and the first mass surrenders of guerrillas on Cheju-Do have since been reported.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-6.pdf)

That document was published in February 1949, six months after the creation of the South Korean government. Perhaps those Japanese backed guerrillas decided to surrender after South Korea gained independence. Their movement quickly died out after that.

“the southern guerrilla movement had been largely wiped out by the spring of 1950” (Kindle Locations 6129 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

The West has to maintain the fiction of an independent Korea because…

While the Central Intelligence Group claimed that the unrest in South Korea was primarily caused by the food shortage, the U.S. Army said the primary cause lay elsewhere.

“The principle factor in political and social turmoil after 1 year and 4 months of occupation is the rapidly growing unrest and impatience of all Koreans, because no visible progress has been made toward Korean Independence,” said John R. Hodge. “This is blamed on both US and Soviet Forces and Nations. This situation makes all Koreans vulnerable to unhappy agitation on any subject whatever, by any self styled leader who will promise a solution no matter how willd.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-8.pdf)

Many Koreans believe “that they will eventually have to fight for their independence.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-4-8.pdf)

Unable to control Korea directly as a colony, both the Soviet Union and America installed puppet governments in their respective areas in order to give the Korean people the appearance of independence. But behind the scenes, even after “independence,” the West was quietly pulling the strings.

North Korea is the stooge of the West

Every book and video I have either read or seen on Korea claims that the North Korean government is independent from foreign influence. This is a lie. This claim is directly contradicted by declassified U.S. government documents.

A top secret report by the National Security Council identifies the North Korean regime as a “puppet regime” of the Soviet Union. (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-7-1.pdf)

The American Mission in Korea reported that the “Soviets have fashioned their north Korean creature in typical Communist monolithic disciplined mould and in the circumstances there is virtually no scope for deviations from Soviet desiderata.” (Page 11) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-7-7.pdf)

“The subordination of this regime to the dicta of Soviet policy is assured by the fact that it has been carefully ‘packed’ with Soviet-trained Koreans holding dual Soviet-Korean citizenship, said the CIA. “Moreover, North Korean military forces have been carefully and soundly developed under Soviet guidance” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-5.pdf)

The ultimate measure of the degree of control the West has over North Korea is how much North Korea is and acts like the state the West wants North Korea to be. Let us first consider what kind of state the West wants North Korea to be.

“Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which will never serve as a base of attack upon the USSR,” said the Central Intelligence Group. “In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost to its own scanty resources in the Far East, the USSR has attempted to make North Korea economically self-sufficient though politically subordinate.” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-4.pdf)

This implies that the West wants North Korea to remain an extremely poor nation, as poor nations require no support and do not pose significant threats to the West. The extreme poverty of North Korea is proof that the West has the state they want. Actually, North Korea was not always so poor in relation to South Korea. For a while after the Cold War began, North Korea was outpacing the south. Had Russia from the start taken measures to completely impoverish North Korea, the people might have overthrown their puppet regime. Russia wanted to make sure life in North Korea was acceptable until they were sure that all Japanese influence was removed from the country. To make sure that they had gotten rid of all Japanese influence, they literally had everyone in North Korea write their life’s story and the read each of them to see whom might be suspicious.

In North Korea, “almost everyone seems to have been at some point asked to write a ‘life story’ to the satisfaction of the state and its various branch organizations.” (Kindle Locations 5173 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

Those who had some attachment to Japan, though they might have tried to lie in writing their story, would not have been successful. If they lied about their past associations, their story would not match the stories written by other people. In all likelihood, the Soviets simply eliminated anyone whose story seemed suspicious or contained significant discrepancies when compared to the stories written by others.

Once confident that they had eliminated Japanese influence, the Soviets had North Korea adopt juche as their political ideology. The word juche literally means “self-reliance.” This ideology of self-reliance nicely dovetails with the Russian desire not to have to support their puppet regime as their puppet regime has declared their determination to be “self-reliant.” This is not a coincidence.

A black hole of misery

The results of having a Russian puppet regime in North Korea are incredible and best explained by Victor Cha, who served on the National Security Council during the Bush administration. During his time there, he negotiated the return of the remains of some U.S. soldiers who died during the Korean War. After he finished the negotiations, he was driven back to South Korea. Once he crossed the border, he boarded a helicopter to fly back to Seoul to talk to the South Korean foreign ministry about his negotiations.

“I’ll never forget getting in the helicopter and then putting on the headset and then talking over the headset with with the control officer who was telling me the things that were coming up that I had to do that afternoon. And then we started reaching the outskirts of the city of Seoul and the first thing I saw as we were on the headset talking was a big, expansive, white factory complex. Huge. And so as we were having this discussion I asked the person, ‘What is that down there?’ Because, you know, I’ve never taken this route from North Korea into Seoul before by air. And the pilot looks down and he goes, ‘Oh, sir, that’s Samsung Electronics Complex.’ Basically, it’s the place where your flat screen TV and every cell phone and PDA device you hold in your hand was probably made there. And I said, ‘Oh, okay. Alright.’” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDsxyFfdt9E&t=08m17s)

“Then we started getting to the outskirts of Seoul. Start seeing highrise apartment buildings, office buildings. Now I’ve seen the skyline in South Korea maybe a thousand times. But this time, again, when I was on the headset trying to work out the meetings, what we had to talk about, I remember the helicopter banking in and then seeing the skyline of Seoul and I just stopped. I just stopped talking because, even though I had seen the skyline of Seoul, I had just come from four days in Pyongyang. And the thing that just struck me at that moment was, I thought, ‘These are the same people.’ Genetically they are the same people. South Koreans, North Koreans, genetically the same people. And yet look at what has happened in South Korea over the past fifty years compared to what I just left in North Korea. At this time I was in government but I’m a political scientist by training as an academic, as a scholar.”

“And the thing that struck me at the time was, ‘There is nothing else to explain this difference but politics.’ This is what politics can do to a country. There is no other way to explain the difference between these two countries. The same people, genetically, the same people. And yet you have South Korea, 12th largest economy in the world, host of the G20 Summit, Nuclear Security Summit, will host the 2018 Winter Olympics, the most wired country in the world in terms of Internet and cell phone usage per household. And then you have North Korea, economic basket case, 10 percent of the population died in the 1990s due to famine, nuclear renegade state. You could not pick two completely opposite things. And it has nothing to do with the people. It has everything to do with politics.”

The misery, poverty, and hopelessness that is North Korea was best shown by a recent satellite photograph of Northeast Asia:

news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140226-north-korea-satellite-photos-darkness-energy/

The photograph makes South Korea look like an island. North Korea is literally a black hole of nothingness amidst the bright, shining lights of the Far East.

The following article contains a chart of the per capita GDP for North and South Korea since the start of the Korean War.

www.aei-ideas.org/2011/12/more-on-dismal-legacy-of-communism-in-n-korea/

Looking at the chart, you can see that the per capita GDP of both countries was essentially identical until about 1975. There was a noticeable dip in output during the Korean War, which began in the summer of 1950 and ended in the summer of 1953. After the war, output stabilized in both countries and stayed nearly the same until about 1965. From that year forward, the South Korean economy expanded rapidly in what became known as the Miracle on the Han River. That South Korea suddenly turned around at that time was not a coincidence. That year, 1965, was the year South Korea and Japan normalized their relations. As part of that process, Japan agreed to help modernize the South Korean economy. POSCO (the world’s fourth largest steelmaker), the Kyungbu Highway, and the Soyang Dam were some of the achievements that Japan helped South Korea build as part of the treaty to normalize relations. (english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2005012004148)

The man who normalized relations with Japan was Park Chung-hee. He became the president of South Korea in 1962 and served in that position until 1979 when he was assassinated. He always had close ties to Japan. During World II, he served in the Japanese Imperial Army.

Japan may have allowed the West to gain control of Korea to prove a point. Perhaps Japan wanted to show everyone that Korea would be worse off under control of the West. Indeed, western control had a devastating effect on Korea, resulting not only in the Korean War, but the perpetual misery of the north. The south would have remained in perpetual misery too had not the West agreed to bring Park Chung-hee to power. South Korea made no progress at all while the country was led by Syngman Rhee, the man installed by the CIA, the man who spent most of his years prior to the war in America.

North Korea, meanwhile, never changed. North Korea never escaped the claws of the Russians. While, for whatever reason, the Russians helped them improve their economy from about 1965 to 1974, before that and after that, the Russians made sure that the North Korean economy remained in perpetual statis. And then, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a tailspin that left her per capita GDP about where it was after the end of the Korean War. Over the past sixty years, North Korea has essentially made no progress at all.

Kim Il-sung

As Communism was well established in Korea by the end of World War II, Russia could have selected an indigenous communist leader for North Korea. They did not do that. They selected a man who, though he was born in Korea, spent almost his entire life overseas. Russia wanted one of their stooges to run their client state. They selected someone whom they had controlled for much of their life. They had to select someone outside Korea. They could not select someone from inside Korea because Korea was, back then, a Japanese colony. Though Korea was not immune to outside influence, the influence Russia could bring to bear on someone who had lived outside Korea was greater than the influence they could bring to bear on someone who had spent their entire life inside Korea.

The outsider they selected to run North Korea was Kim Il-sung. He was born in 1912. When he was seven, he “migrated with his family in 1919 to Manchuria. Except for a brief return to Korea in 1923–25, Kim spent his formative years in Manchuria from the age of seven until the age of twenty-eight, when he fled with other anti-Japanese guerrillas to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1940.” (Kindle Locations 670-672 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

During the thirties, Kim fought the Japanese in Manchuria for the Russians. Russia had, for a long time, maintained a sphere of influence there. Russia had the northern part of Manchuria. Japan had the southern part. In 1935, Russia had to sell their stake in the railroad there. But they always hoped to restore their influence in Manchuria later on. Kim kept fighting Japan on behalf of the Russians until 1940 when the Japanese military essentially wiped out the Korean guerrillas and forced the remnants, including Kim Il-sung, to flee to their masters, the Russians.

“The guerrilla movement, Kim admits, ended in disappointment.” (Kindle Location 829 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“In late 1940, Kim and his unit crossed the Soviet border and joined Chinese and Korean guerrillas in two Soviet base camps.” (Kindle Locations 745-746 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

The Russians gave “shelter and direct assistance” to Kim and his compatriots, “even if that meant the latter’s absorption into the Soviet Army.” (Kindle Locations 756-757 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

From that time until the end of the war, Kim Il-sung and his fellow Russian stooges spent their time in Russia, waiting for the war to end, waiting for their opportunity to seize control of Korea. They had “placed their hopes more than ever on a successful Soviet entry into the war against Japan.” (Kindle Locations 755-756 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

After their experience during the thirties, they knew they were worthless as fighters.

“Few had any illusions would defeat Japanese imperialism, but on the entry of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.” (Kindle Locations 854-855 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

These stooges did not even contribute anything to the war effort.

“The Koreans in Kim’s group were not direct participants in the liberation of Korea and did not even enter the country until a month after the Japanese surrender.” (Kindle Locations 1117-1118 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

When the Russians installed him in North Korea after the war, Kim Il-sung and his comrades were practically foreigners in their own country. Prior to their arrival, “these activists did not build up a base of popular support gradually and over a large geographical area in their own country like the Chinese and Vietnamese communists.” (Kindle Locations 661-662 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

Kim adopts the anti-Japanese ideology of the Russians

Upon seizing power, Kim proceeded to do whatever the Russians wanted, which meant eliminating Japanese influence.

“Eliminating the ‘vestiges’ of Japanese colonialism was one of the most frequently expressed goals of the new regime.” (Kindle Locations 6382 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

The Russians built up an anti-Japanese mythology for him.

Kim Il-sung “came to personify the anti-Japanese resistance.” (Kindle Location 5933 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“the family of Kim Il Sung was entirely a patriotic anti-Japanese revolutionary family,” said one North Korean textbook used by their soldiers. (Kindle Locations 5887 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

North Korea and Christianity

Prior to the war, Christian organizations in Korea provided endless amounts of trouble for the Japanese authorities.

“It is well-known that Christianity played an important role in Korea’s nationalist movement during the Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945 and that Christian churches had often been hotbeds of Korean resistance against Japan.” (Page 1091 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

One might have predicted that these organizations would continue to cause trouble once the Russians, the godless communists, took over. Indeed, the CIA acknowledged that “religious groups with a Western orientation” were one of the “three main groups” which were “capable of offering any organized resistance” to the communization of North Korea. That did not happen, however. They provided little, if any resistance.

“Protestant and Catholic religious groups in North Korea have either been effectively absorbed into the Democratic People’s Front or have been declared illegal and their terror-paralyzed leadership placed under house arrest,” said the CIA. (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-5.pdf)

That those groups were so intent on opposing Japanese rule of Korea, but not Soviet rule of Korea, is further evidence that those groups were really controlled by western intelligence agencies, who used those groups to oppose Japan before the war. It is further evidence that the West and the Russians are secretly working together too. That is why those groups, who should have fought the Russians vigorously, instead acquiesced.

Nevertheless, the North Korean Communists claimed to be suspicious of those Christians.

“Christians were politically suspect, not so much because of their religious beliefs, but because of their association with the United States and with anticommunist organizations in the South. Since American Protestant missionaries had been instrumental in propagating Christianity in Korea, and ties between such missionaries and Korean Christians were still quite active in the South, these suspicions were not unwarranted.” (Kindle Locations 3079 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

North Korea accused the “American imperialists” of “wearing the mask of religion” during the Japanese occupation of Korea. North Korea accused America of “acting behind the Japanese imperialists in the name of ‘charitable work.’” (Page 1084 to 1085 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

There is a great deal of truth in these statements, although they are misleading in several crucial respects. To begin with, the American missionaries who were “wearing the mask of religion” did so to foment unrest in Korea against the Japanese authorities. Secondly, those American missionaries who recruited Koreans to do their dirty work, to attack Japan, had amongst their recruits none other than the family of the future leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung.

“in the beginning communists worked closely with Christians—indeed, some of the more prominent communist leaders themselves, including Kim Il Sung, came from Christian backgrounds.” (Kindle Location 3077 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

Before the Soviets grabbed a hold of him, Kim Il-sung was actually a pawn of American intelligence. Early on in his life, however, America handed him over to the Russians. His transfer from being a pawn of the Americans to being a pawn of the Russians is yet another example of the secret collaboration between Russia and America.

Kang Pan-sok

Both of his parents were devoted Christians.

“President Kim’s father was a good Christian, and his mother was also a good Christian,” said Shungnak Luke Kim, a reverend who “knew Kim Il-song’s family intimately.” (Page 1088 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

His mother was Kang Pan-sok.

“Her whole life, as far as Rev. Kim remembers, was centered on the church.” (Page 1088 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Her devotion to Christianity apparently came from her father, Kang Ton-uk.

“Kang Ton-uk was a well-known and influential church leader.” (Page 1087 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Sungsil Academy

The father of Kim Il-sung, Kim Hyong-jik, went to a high school called Sungsil Academy.

“Sungsil Academy was not an ordinary Korean school, but was an American missionary school whose main objective was to train Korean Christian leaders who would proselytize for Christianity.” (Page 1083 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Every student at Sungsil was a devoted Christian. Skeptics were not allowed to attend the school.

“In order to gain admission into Sungsil Academy, students had to prove their devotion to Christianity at least to the extent of convincing both American missionaries and the students’ own Korean church leaders.” (Page 1084 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Choson Kungminhoe

After leaving Sungsil Academy, Kim Hyong-jik joined the Choson Kungminhoe (the Korean National Association), a Christian organization which was dedicated to fighting Japan, an organization that was apparently created and supported by America.

“it was organized by an associate of Pak Yong-man, a well-known nationalist who led the Taehanin Kungminhoe (Korean National Association) in the United States and Hawaii. According to the Japanese police report, the person who was responsible for organizing and leading the Choson Kungminhoe in Korea was Chang Il-hwan, who had been to Hawaii where he had met Pak Yong-man and promised to work for him. After his return to Korea, he schemed secretly to organize the Kungminhoe to carry out Pak Yong-man's plans for restoring Korea's independence.” (Page 1086 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

The purpose of the Kungminhoe was “to realize our ideals by coordinating our activities with Kungminhoe of the United States and the compatriots in other countries.” (Page 1086 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

“Having recruited Pae Min-su and Kim Hyong-jik as new members, Chang II-hwan met with these two men at his home during the month of February 1917. It was then decided to recruit members from young Christians who were gathering in P’yongyang from different parts of the country to attend P’yongyang Presbyterian Theological Seminary,” said one Japanese report. (Page 1086 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Early history of Kim Il-sung and Christianity

Because his parents were so devoted to Christianity, Kim Il-sung, as their child, was too indoctrinated with Christian ideology.

“His mother was an unusually devout Christian, so it was only natural that her son attended church.” (Page 1089 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

During his brief stay in Korea from 1923 to 1925, Kim Il-sung attended a school which “was founded and run by his maternal grandfather, Kang Ton-uk, a church elder. It was also a Christian school” (Page 1088 to 1089 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Later on, after Kim Il-sung returned to Manchuria, there was “an eyewitness who remembers him as attending church regularly.” (Page 1089 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Kim Il-sung a Christian all his life

Kim Il-sung never abandoned his faith in Christianty. Once he seized power in North Korea, Kim Il-sung showed no hesitation in appointing his Christian relatives to positions of power.

“The late Kang Yang-uk, who as a Christian minister rose to the position of Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea, was a second cousin of Kang Ton-uk.” (Page 1087 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Kim Il-sung's devotion to Christianity was on display in a meeting he had with Rev. Shungnak Luke Kim in June 1981.

“President Kim honored me with a lunch, and he asked me to offer grace at the lunch table,” said Rev. Kim. “So I did.” (Page 1090 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

“At the end of the prayer, Kim Il-song uttered clearly, ‘Amen.’” (Page 1090 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

During their meeting, Kim Il-sung had nothing but kind words for the reverend's father.

“He said he knew my father as a good leader of the country. His father had studied at Soong Sil High School [Sungsil Academy] at the time my father was teaching there.” (Page 1088 of Christian Background in the Early Life of Kim Il-Song)

Russia maintains its influence behind the scenes

Even after the so-called “withdrawal” of Soviet forces from North Korea, “Soviet advisors remained with North Korean forces at least to the battalion level and possibly as far down as the company level.” (Kindle Locations 6021 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“Between 1945 and 1948 several thousand Koreans who were sent to the Soviet Union for various kinds of education and training, including military training. KPA staff officers secretly began training in Moscow from April 1948. In contrast to the South Korean army, led by men who had been trained in the Japanese army, all Korean officers who had served in the Japanese military were purged from the North Korean army by June 1948.” (Kindle Locations 6025 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

Hiding the truth

Though in reality, as this evidence proves, North Korea was, and remains to this day, a puppet state of the West, the West, ironically, is determined to convince the public otherwise. The West wants to maintain the fiction that North Korea is an independent state for two reasons. The West wants the people of North Korea to believe their leaders are not western stooges. Were the people of North Korea to know the truth, they would overthrow their government. To prevent that from happening, the West does its best to maintain the illusion that North Korea is independent, even though it is not.

The West is ultimately responsible for the idiotic behavior of North Korea. But the West does not want anyone to know this. Were others to know the truth, they would demand that the West be held accountable for the crimes committed by their North Korean stooges. To hide this truth from everyone else, the West, again, has to convince everyone that North Korea is independent.

There are many examples of literature produced by the West which argue that North Korea is independent. One example is the book "The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950"

“the North Korean revolution was not simply the offspring of the Soviet occupation authorities. The political order that emerged in North Korea in the postliberation period combined Soviet input and influence with the legacy of Japanese colonial rule, a native Korean revolutionary tradition that reemerged in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender, and the participation of Koreans who were much closer to the Chinese communist movement than to the Soviet Union.” (Kindle Locations 6348 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

China and North Korea

Instead of saying that North Korea is the stooge of the West, the book hints of some mysterious connection between North Korea and the Chinese Communists.

“If the Soviet gave indispensable training and equipment to the KPA, the connection to the Chinese communist army and the Korean veterans of the Chinese revolution represented a more intimate, more personal, and less material, Chinese influence in the North Korean military.” (Kindle Locations 6038 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

The real relationship between North Korea and China is the exact opposite of what the author implies. The best explanation of the real relationship between China and North Korea comes, again, from Victor Cha, who, though he briefly served on the National Security Council, has the curious habit of sometimes telling the truth in public, which is a rare commodity amongst former government officials.

“China does not love North Korea. China does not believe that North Korea is its little Communist brother that it must protect. China despises North Korea. It is an albatross around its neck. Everytime the North Koreans do something bad it’s like throwing mud on the Chinese face because when the North Koreans do something bad, everyone blames China. Why don’t you stop them? Why don’t you do something about this? So they despise the North Koreans. But at the same time, they’re the only North Koreans they got. Because if they allow North Korea to collapse, then what do they get? They get a democratic South Korea that’s a military ally of the United States right on their border. They don’t want that.” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRe7dOLeAso&t=42m57s)

From this quote, we can deduce why the author implied that the Chinese were close to the North Koreans. The West wants to blame China for everything North Korea does. Whenever the West wants to pressure China, they secretly tell their North Korean stooges to do something stupid (e.g. shoot a missile into the sea, test detonate a nuclear weapon, etc.). Then, the West, along with everyone else, blames China. North Korea is dependent on the Chinese economy for its survival. If China would just apply a little bit of pressure, surely the North Koreans would stop acting like idiots.

China knows all this. They know that North Korea is the stooge of the West. They really do not want to support them. That in turn induces the North Koreans to hate China, which creates a rather vicious cycle.

“I think the North Koreans despise the Chinese too. The Chinese treat them like dirt. They basically treat them like a poor province. But they’re the only Chinese they got.” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRe7dOLeAso&t=54m25s)

The animosity the North Koreans have toward China was on display during one of their nuclear tests (again, you could say their actions were really a reflection of how the West views China).

“It seems like they almost dare the Chinese to drop them. They do this nuclear test on Chinese New Years. I have to tell you when I was at Six Party Talks, the Chinese were great hosts, forever patient. We would be in negotiations the week before Christmas and these things would go on and on and on. And our Chinese hosts would say, ‘Well, it looks like we’re going to carry into the following week. And we, being the American delegation said, ‘No way. We’re going home. It’s Christmas. We’re stopping tomorrow. And that’s it. Tell the North Koreans we’re stopping tomorrow.’ And the Chinese would say, ‘Patience. You Americans are always in a rush. Be patient.’ Well, one time we had a round of Six Party Talks in February. And it was the week before the Chinese New Year. And so the North Koreans were being the North Koreans again. And so we’re waiting and waiting and waiting. And so we said to our Chinese hosts, ‘Well, it looks like we’re going to have to go into next week.’ And the only time I saw the Chinese loose their cool was then. They said, ‘No! There is no way we’re going into next week!’ And we were kind of joking around we said, ‘Why? It’s just Valentine’s Day.’ ‘No! Absolutely not!’ The fact that they did this test during Chinese New Years when all of these officials had to come back from vacation is really a slap in the face. And it’s like they’re almost daring the Chinese to drop them. But they know that for China that these are the only North Koreans they’ve got and they can’t allow the regime to collapse. And so that’s a way of saying, ‘I don’t think they do fear the Chinese.’” (www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRe7dOLeAso&t=54m50s)

The Minsaengdan Incident

The animosity between North Korea and China precedes World War II. The animosity stems from an incident which took place during the thirties, when Kim Il-sung was in Manchuria fighting the Japanese.

In February 1932, a group of Koreans formed an organization called the Minsaengdan (People’s Livelihood Corps).

“The Minsaengdan sought Japanese protection from both the communists and the Chinese authorities,” (Kindle Locations 710-713 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

This organization was dissolved later that year, in October. Though the Minsaengdan lasted less than a year, it had a profound effect on the relations between the Chinese Communists and Kim Il-sung (who was in those days technically a member of the Communist Party of China). The Chinese Communists feared that some of the Koreans, like Kim Il-sung, who were members of their party, were secretly aligned with the Minsaengdan.

“Suspicions that any Korean could be secretly a member of the pro-Japanese and anticommunist Minsaengdan ran deep among the Chinese communists in Manchuria. In a series of purges from 1933 to 1936, over one thousand Koreans were arrested and expelled from the Chinese Communist Party as Minsaengdan suspects, including Kim Il Sung, who was arrested in late 1933 and exonerated in early 1934. All those arrested were ethnic Koreans, and some five hundred were killed.” (Kindle Locations 713-717 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

One of the reasons why the Russians picked Kim Il-sung to lead North Korea was because of this unfortunate history with the Chinese Communists. The Russians knew that Kim would harbor some amount of resentment towards the Chinese Communists due to this incident. They knew that, once Kim Il-sung was put in charge of North Korea, he would not blindly align his policies with the people who once persecuted him. What the West fears the most is that the countries of the Far East will work together to fight them. To prevent that from happening, the West adopts a policy of divide and rule. They try to make the people of the region hate each other. The selection of Kim Il-sung is one example of this.

Syngman Rhee

On the other side of the Korean peninsula, in South Korea, America set up their own puppet regime headed by Syngman Rhee. He is a textbook example of the type of person whom the West chooses as their puppets. To begin with, he spent much of his time in America.

“Rhee has spent most of his life in exile, largely in the US.” (Page 9) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

Syngman Rhee tends “to regard the best interests of Korea as synonymous with his own. It is as if he, in his own mind at least, were Korea.” (Page 9) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

“Rhee’s vanity has made him highly susceptible to the contrived flattery of self-seeking interests in the US and in Korea. His intellect is a shallow one, and his behavior is often irrational and literally childish.” (Page 9) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

“Rhee carefully built up the illusion, inside Korea, that his opinions carried considerable weight with high US officials and that internationally he was regarded as the spokesman for the Korean people. In a short time following his return, Rhee became the only Korean leader with any sort of popular following, and his name was spread throughout Korea as the champion of Korean independence.” (Page 10) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

“Dollars have been secured by direct contribution from his Korean following in Hawaii and in the US and by certain dubious exchange manipulations in Korea. His US backers have contributed to his cause in the hope of obtaining economic concessions in Korea upon Rhee’s rise to power, or of gaining social prestige through their connection with Rhee, or because of a wish to encourage anti-Communist regimes wherever possible. Many humble Koreans have been persuaded, by one means or another, to contribute won to Rhee’s cause, and wealthy Koreans have donated large sums on the basis of promises of favors or position on Rhee’s coming into control, or because of Rhee’s ‘influence’ with the US authorities.” (Page 11) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

“he undoubtedly recognizes that his government’s very existence depends upon aid from the US and that the US cannot be expected to grant that aid without a considerable voice in how it shall be used.” (Page 11) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

North Korea wants to invade the South

“While it is considered very unlikely that the Kremlin will authorize aggressive action against the southern zone as long as US forces remain in occupation, it is probable that current Soviet plans call for an attempt to overthrow the South Korean regime immediately following US withdrawal.” (Page 5) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

“following US withdrawal, there will be no force, or coalition of forces, in South Korea capable of effective resistance to eventual domination by the North.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-5.pdf)

“Withdrawal of US forces from Korea in the spring of 1949 would probably in time be followed by an invasion … by the North Korean People’s Army” (Page 1) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-9-1.pdf)

“North Korean domination of the South will be an inevitable consequence of US troop withdrawal.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-5.pdf)

“The existence of an adequate native security force in South Korea would serve as the only real deterrent to Soviet-inspired aggression. The problems involved in the creation of such a force would be considerable. It is believed, nevertheless, that in the period prior to the withdrawal of US forces, a South Korean Army and small air component could be trained and equipped which would be competent to deal with any external threat short of open invasion by the Red Army proper.” (Page 6) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-8-7.pdf)

America withdrew its forces from a South Korea despite the pleas of the people their for those forces to stay.

South Korea was “disturbed by the … withdrawal of United States occupation forces because of what they regarded as the inadequacy of existing Korean security forces.” (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-9-13.pdf)

“what they really wanted was a specific assurance that the United States would come to the defence of the Republic of Korea in the event of an armed attack against it.” But they were told that “such a specific military commitment by the United States was out of the question.” (Page 2) (www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/kr-9-13.pdf)

“In January 1950 U.S. military intelligence noted a marked acceleration in military training and conscription in North Korea.” (Kindle Location 6052 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

“Soviet assistance would come at a price: specifically, a minimum of twenty-five thousand tons of lead to the USSR annually.” (Kindle Location 6091 from The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950)

Korean War

America knew that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea would likely lead to an invasion from the North. But we withdrew our forces anyways. South Korea pleaded for a security guarantee, a promise from America to intervene if the North invaded. Had we given South Korea this promise, had we informed the North that we would intervene if they invaded, that should have prevented the subsequent invasion and war. At least it would have if the North Korean leadership were competent in the least. Nevertheless, we refused to provide South Korea with the assurance that she so desired.

In a speech delivered at the start of 1950, Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, defined the region of the Far East which America would protect military. (www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/44/1950-01-12.pdf) He declared a “defensive perimeter.” America would protect everything within this area. Included in this “defensive perimeter” was Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines.

“So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack,” he said. “Should such an attack occur ... the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on.”

As South Korea was not included in his “defensive perimeter,” in the event of an invasion by North Korea, the South would have to rely on the UN. However, to ask South Korea to rely on the UN was an unreasonable request in the extreme. Russia was a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Russia could veto any resolution brought before the council. Surely Russia would veto any resolution which authorized the UN to take action against their puppet regime in North Korea.

Knowing that Russia could veto any UN resolution on Korea, knowing that South Korea was outside the defensive perimeter of America, North Korea had every right to feel that, if they invaded the South, no one else would intervene.

North Korea began their invasion of the South in the summer of 1950. The matter was referred to the UN. But, much to everyone's surprise, Russia did not veto the resolution to authorize military intervention. The actions of Russia and America in the run up to the Korean War are perhaps the most notorious example of how those two countries, who claim to be enemies, are secretly working together. At least on the surface, they had apparently tricked North Korea into invading the South by making them believe that America would not intervene.

In reality, however, such a deception was not necessary, at least when it came to Kim Il-sung. He wanted to invade the South in March of 1949. That was before America placed South Korea outside her “defense perimeter.” I assume the deception was meant for other North Koreans, who may have been more reticent to invade the South, believing that such an action would not turn out well for their country. In the subsequent years, Kim Il-sung would continue to eliminate anyone who opposed orders from Russia. Indeed they used the Korean War, in part, for that purpose - to eliminate their opponents. They made sure their opponents were massacred during the war.

America’s actions in the run-up to the Korean War prove that America wanted the war. America had two options. Either South Korea was worth fighting for or it wasn’t. If it was, we should have included South Korea in our “defensive perimeter” in order to deter an attack from North Korea. Alternatively, if we felt that South Korea was not worth fighting for, we should not have intervened after the North invaded. We should have told the Russians and the people of South Korea that we would agree to the communization of the Korean Peninsula and then worked out the arrangements necessary to accomplish that task peacefully. Many lives would have been saved. But instead of acting honorably, we essentially invited North Korea to attack the South (which we knew would happen, as shown in the declassified documents I have mentioned). Then we used this invasion as a pretext to launch our own counterattack. Our actions can only be explained if one admits that America, like Russia, wanted the Korean War to occur.

The war unfolded in a very unnatural way. The fighting began at the center of the peninsula, as one might expect. The battlefront then proceeded southward. North Korea nearly conquered the entire peninsula, but at the last second South Korea was saved by the U.S. military. The battlefront then swept northward, all the way to the border with China. North Korea was nearly defeated when, again, at the last second, the Chinese military intervened. The Chinese managed to push the battlefront back to approximately the original border between North Korea and South Korea. The battlefront would remain there for the rest of the war until a ceasefire was agreed to, a ceasefire that remains in place to this very day.

This is a very unusual way for a war to unfold. Once the North Koreans had pushed the battlefront to the southern end of the peninsula, one would have thought they would have won the war and communized the peninsula. But miraculously, at the last second, the U.S. military came to the rescue (which was even more miraculous considering that they could only do so because the Russians had refused to use their veto at the UN Security Council). Then, once the Americans pushed the battlefront to the north end of the peninsula, one would have thought the South Korean regime would have emerged victorious and seized control of the entire peninsula. But then, suddenly, the Chinese intervened. Once they entered the war, one would have thought that either they would have been ineffective, which would mean that the South Korean regime would have gained control of the peninsula. Or one would have thought their forces would have been sufficient for the North Koreans to push the battlefront all the way to the southern end of the peninsula and win the war. Or, perhaps, if the two forces were very evenly matched, then once the Chinese intervened, the battlefront would not move at all. Instead of any of these three seemingly more likely possibilities, the Chinese were able to push the battlefront southward, back to almost exactly where the war started. But once they reached the original starting point of the war, which was, again miraculously, very nearly where the original border between North Korea and South Korea was located, they were able to make no further progress. Both sides eventually agreed to a ceasefire, essentially where the war began, which might have left one to conclude that nothing had changed at all except there were now millions of dead Koreans who had only a short while before been alive.

This rather baffling series of events can be explained when one realizing what the West wanted to achieve during the war. If the goal was to slaughter every last bit of Japanese influence on the peninsula, then the battlefront would have to traverse every single inch of the Korea, which is exactly what happened. The West used the Korean War to literally slaughter any remnants of Japanese influence. There were many massacres during the war.

“The largest civilian massacres occurred on the sites of the former Japanese occupation,” said Akira Kobayashi. (www.japanfocus.org/-Kobayashi-Akira/3351)

In Korea, the areas which were populated by Japanese citizens were undoubtedly full of Koreans who had collaborated with Japan before World War II, while Korea was still a Japanese colony. I assume this is why the West reserved its largest massacres for those areas. The West wanted to kill anyone who might have had any ties to Japan.

The West used the Korean War to isolate China. With the the U.S. military charging toward the Chinese border, China decided to intervene. Once that happened, America declared that China was evil and ended its economic relationship with China and demanded that Japan do the same.

You just can't fix stupid

The West apparently succeeded in killing all remaining Japanese influence in North Korea after the Korean War. One indication of how the war and subsequent years strengthened their control of the peninsula is that in 1965 and 1975, Kim Il-sung wanted to again invade South Korea and asked China to support him. (www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1338870/north-korea-wanted-second-korean-war-1965-says-chinese-scholar) After having seen what happened the last time North Korea invaded the South, China refused. Without China's support, Kim Il-sung decided against invading the South.

One can easily see why China would refuse to support a second invasion of South Korea. The Korean War was a disaster for them. Nearly two hundred thousand Chinese were killed. (www.china.org.cn/china/2010-06/28/content_20365659.htm) The West used the war as a pretext to isolate China economically both from the West and from Japan.

One has a harder time understanding why Kim Il-sung would want to invade South Korea again. The war was an even bigger disaster for Korea than it was for China. Millions of Koreans died. (www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/world/asia/korean-war-fast-facts/) And for all that misery and suffering, the end of the war left the peninsula still divided. There was no reason to believe that, in 1965 or in 1975, another Korean War would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. And yet that is what Kim Il-sung proposed.

Since there was no reason to believe that a second Korean War would be anything but a complete disaster for both Korea and China, for Kim Il-sung to propose such a course of action proves that he never considered the interests of the Korean people nor the Chinese people when making his decisions. It proves that he was controlled from somewhere outside those two countries. To determine who controlled Kim Il-sung, one needs to determine who wanted him to start a second Korean War. For that, one needs to determine who would benefit from such a war. That Kim Il-sung proposed to invade the South in 1965 is no coincidence.

The West created the Korean War, in part, in a desperate attempt to help France defeat the Viet Minh in Indochina. Before the war, China was giving large amounts of aid to the Viet Minh. But after the Korean War began, once the Chinese intervened, “their aid to the Indo-Chinese  Communists began to decrease, the offensive of the latter began to slacken.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1951/04/11/86955084.html)

China had to spend more of her resources on her own efforts in the Korean Peninsula.

“One of the benefits that have accrued, at least in part, from the heavy Chinese Communist commitment in Korea is an improvement in the situation on the Indo-Chinese front. A short time ago the Communist rebels under Ho Chi Minh announced that they had abandoned frontal or positional warfare for the time being and would revert to guerrilla tactics. It is logical to assume that the Chinese Communist involvement in Korea played an important part in this decision.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1951/04/27/89793866.html)

“any easing up of the free world’s pressure on the Chinese Communists in one spot would only precipitate new Chinese Communist attacks in another spot. In these circumstances lies the justification of the United Nations effort to pin the Chinese Communists down in Korea until they are willing to talk real peace.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1951/04/11/86955084.html)

France declared “that the conflicts in Korea and Indo-China were part of one war” and “that there could be no settlement in Korea without taking account of Indo-China.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1951/10/10/88461307.html)

Though the Korean War reached a stalemate by the summer of 1951, the war continued for two more years. Since the West had no interest in ending the partition of the Korean Peninsula, they made sure the battlefront remained essentially in the same place for those two years. They made sure the battlefront was located essentially where the war began, near the original border between North and South Korea. That way, whenever the situation in Vietnam was resolved, they could immediately have their stooges in North and South Korea declare a ceasefire and end the Korean War with the original partition of Korea in place.

But the situation in Vietnam never tilted in their favor. Instead, the situation deteriorated. In the spring of 1953, the Viet Minh attack the French in Laos. The West, realizing that they might lose Laos too, decided to end the war in Korea rather risk the Viet Minh seizing all of Indochina. A ceasefire in Korea was agreed to a few months later. A temporary end to the fighting in Vietnam was established about a year after that.

The Second Indochina War, known in America as the Vietnam War, officially began with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964, which America staged as a pretext to intervene. Again engulfed in a war in Vietnam, the West thought it might be useful if, like during the First Indochina War, if their North Korean stooges started another Korean War to keep the Chinese Communists occupied and limit their assistance to the Viet Minh. They had their stooge, Kim Il-sung, ask the Chinese to support him militarily against South Korea. This time, however, having seen what happened last time, the Chinese Communists wisely refused to come to his aid. Once China refused to come to the aid of Kim Il-sung, the West decided that a second Korean War was not worthwhile. A war would not have achieved their goal of limiting Chinese assistance to the Viet Minh.

The West had another motivation for wanting North Korea to invade the South in 1965. This was the year when South Korea and Japan normalized relations. This was the year when Park Chung-hee, the former member of the Japanese Imperial Army, began to steer his country on to the path of prosperity with Japan's help. Park could not have come to power in South Korea without the assent of the West. That the West allowed Park to take control of South Korea deserves some amount of scrutiny, particularly given the timing of his emergence which coincided with the start of the Vietnam War. Were North Korea to invade the South at this juncture, at a minimum, the emergence of South Korea would have been delayed. Had the war resulted in either the death of Park Chung-hee or his ouster, the emergence of South Korea might have been sabotaged completely. The West wanted to use a second Korean War as leverage against Japan. The West was hoping to entice Japan into cooperating on Vietnam. Had North Korea invaded South Korea, the West could have used the war to threaten Park. Whenever the West wanted to increase their pressure on Japan, they could have had North Korea succeed militarily. Whenever the West wanted to decrease pressure on Japan, they would have had their North Korean stooges bungle their attacks. Whether the West would increase or decrease pressure on Japan, would depend on how the Vietnam War was proceeding. If the Viet Minh were succeeding, the West would retaliate by having North Korea strike out at the South. If the Viet Minh were stumbling, they could have their North Korean stooges reduce the intensity or effectiveness of their attacks. All of this, however, was predicated on Chinese support for the North Koreans. Without their support, North Korea could not fight a war against the South.

Had North Korea invaded the South without China's support, China might have been so furious that they would have sided with South Korea against the North. Indeed, if they were smart that is exactly what they would have done. They would have been able to have gotten rid of a regime which was nothing more than a puppet regime of the West, a regime whose actions would constantly plague China in the ensuing decades. China would have been able to use the war as part of their argument for normalizing relations with the West and Japan. We came to your rescue when North Korea invaded South Korea. You guys should drop your economic restrictions against us.

The third proposal to invade South Korea, which Kim Il-sung made a decade later in 1975, was every bit as stupid as his proposal in 1965. There was no reason then to believe then that the result would be any better. Here too, an examination of the conditions in the region will indicate why Kim Il-sung made this proposal. The Vietnam War had just ended. The Vietnam War was similar to the Korean War in that the West wanted to use the war to isolate China. The West could not use the Korean War as an excuse to isolate China forever. As the years passed, the voices calling for normalization of relations with China grew louder, particularly in Japan. There were a series of moves between China and Japan to improve relations, notably the Laio-Takasaki Agreement in 1962. To prevent this rapprochement, the West created the Vietnam War. China again sided with the Communists in the North. With China and America again on opposite sides of a war, that effectively cut off Japan's move to improve relations with China. Japan was then an ally of America. The alliance with America prevented Japan from moving forward with its relations with China. Or so it seemed.

Though the West hoped the Vietnam War would be a repeat of the Korean War, in reality the war was very different. To begin with, unlike in Korea where you had governments in the North and South who were both controlled by the West, the North Vietnamese had a hatred of the West that was perhaps unmatched anywhere else on this planet. Unlike the North and South Korean governments, who probably did not care too much whether their country was divided, who were disposed to obeying orders from the West, the North Vietnamese were radical nationalists in the extreme, who demanded unification and freedom from western influence above all else.

Unlike the North Korean regime, whom the Japanese and Chinese absolutely despise, the North Vietnamese regime, though both Japan and China might deny it, in reality both Japan and China have, if not publicly, then at least secretly, supported the North Vietnamese. Both Japan and China wanted the North Vietnamese to defeat the South and unify the country. China provided direct support to the North during the war. Japan provided support in establishing the Viet Minh initially. Once the Viet Minh began fighting the Americans during the sixties, Japan provided indirect support by fomenting a large leftist movement in Japan. This movement opposed the Vietnam War. This was important because the antiwar movement was essentially a threat to end the relationship between Japan and America, to communized Japan, to align Japan with China, Vietnam, and the rest of Asia in a united group of countries whom absolutely hated the West. There is nothing that the West feared more than this.

To prevent that from happening, the West decided to allow the reunification of Vietnam, Nixon made a historic visit to China which started America and China on the path to rapprochement, Communist China was admitted to the UN, Taiwan was expelled from the UN, and America allowed Japan to normalize relations with China. This rapprochement between Japan and America on the one side, and Communist China on the other side, which took place during the Nixon administration, would not be completed until the Carter administration. During the Carter administration, Japan finally signed a peace treaty with China and America finally normalized relations with China. These two events took place in 1978 and 1979.

These historic achievements were made possible by the end of the Vietnam War, the reunification of the country in April 1975. With Vietnam no longer an impediment to relations between China, Japan, and America, a path was opened for a better future for China. This was a welcome development for both Japan and China. This development was not welcome by Europe, America, or Russia. In the hopes of finding yet another excuse to delay normalization, the West had their ultimate stooge, Kim Il-sung, travel to China and ask them to support him in an invasion of South Korea. For the second time, China refused his request.

“Beijing was unwilling to undertake any steps which could have jeopardized rapprochement with the United States,” said Ria Chae. (www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/nkidp-e-dossier-no-7-east-german-documents-kim-il-sung%E2%80%99s-april-1975-trip-to-beijing)

His visit occurred in April 1975, the same month the North Vietnamese reunified their country. Had China agreed to support the invasion of a South Korea, the West would have again had their excuse to isolate China and the peace treaty with Japan and the normalization of relations with America would have been delayed for years, if not a decade.

Imagine that

The conversation which unfolded between Kim Il-sung and his Chinese interlocutors in 1965 and 1975, when Kim Il-sung proposed another invasion of South Korea, is something of a minor fascination for me. In all likelihood, the conversation was fairly boring, with Kim Il-sung asking for permission and the Chinese officials politely refusing. But hypothetically speaking, had those Chinese officials instead decided to tell Kim Il-sung what they really thought, the conversation might have gone something like this.

Kim Il-sung: I want to invade South Korea again. Could you guys help me out?

Chinese official: How could you make such an idiotic proposal? Are you stupid? This is literally the dumbest proposal you could possibly make. Millions of Koreans would die, again. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese would die, again. Progress on the peninsula would be obliterated, again. The a West would use the war as an excuse to continue to isolate us. And for all the cost and misery involved, the peninsula would still be partitioned in the end.

A better proposal would be for you to invade China and then we could topple your sorry regime, reunify the peninsula, reunite the Korean people, and earn, perhaps, a little bit of credit and admiration from the rest of the world. The people of Korea would be much better off without having an idiot like you in charge. There may be some downsides to having the South Korean regime in control of the entire peninsula, but those downsides can't possibly be worse than having a moron like you in charge of a country.

In short, the answer to your proposal is, "No." Now go away. Shoo. Shoo.

[Kim Il-sung hangs his head and scurries back to North Korea.]




The Korean War was a conspiracy whose trajectory was determined before the war even started. The plan for the war was not even tightly held. Lots of people knew how the war would progress. One of those people was Yan Xishan, a Chinese warlord, who published a book called “Peace or World War” right before the war began. In his book, he predicted

www.froginawell.net/korea/2010/07/a-chinese-warlords-predictions-for-the-korean-war/