Tuesday, May 20, 2014

China


Wang Ming: the Chinese version of Kim Il-sung

Like in Korea, the Russians tried to install their stooges at the top of the Communist Party of China. Like in Korea, the Russians wanted the Chinese Communists to define themselves by their opposition to Japan.

Stalin “wanted the Chinese Reds to fight Japan, and to get his policy enforced he flew his most loyal Chinese acolyte to Yenan in a special plane in November 1937. This was Wang Ming” (Kindle Locations 4250-4251 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Russians gave Wang two slogans, slogans which they wanted the Chinese Communists to adopt and implement. The slogans were: “Subordinate everything to the national anti-Japanese united front” and “Everything through the national anti-Japanese united front.” Wang faithfully transmitted these slogans to the Chinese Communist leadership in December, but the party never really implemented these policies. (Page 91 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Rather than allow the Russians to take over the party, the Chinese Communists made Mao Zedong their leader.

“Mao could count on overwhelming support from the old guard of the party, who looked upon the returned students as upstarts whose unwarranted rise to power had been imposed on the CCP by the Soviets.” (Page 92 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Under Mao's leadership, the Chinese Communists generally avoided fighting the Japanese military.

“It is not a good idea … to undertake large-scale action,” said Mao. “Our armies are weak. Action will inevitably do irreparable damage.” (Kindle Locations 4885-4886 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Mao’s refusal to help infuriated Moscow” (Kindle Locations 4897-4898 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

His refusal also infuriated their stooge, Wang Ming, who wrote a cable to Stalin which accused Mao of committing “many crimes.” These crimes were both “anti-Soviet and anti-Party.” (Kindle Location 5267 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Mao had no personal affection for Moscow. Throughout his time in power, Mao was only interested in trying to get the most he could out of the Russians, while giving them as little in return as possible.

Mao said that any cooperation with Russia should be purely “strategic [i.e., in name only].” (Kindle Location 4888 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Unlike in Korea, where the Russians were able to install their stooges, in China, their stooges were marginalized. Wang Ming was eventually sent back to Russia where he lived out the remainder of his years. He “died in exile in Moscow” (Kindle Location 5226 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Chinese Communists recruit members of the Japanese Imperial Army

Not only did the Chinese Communists avoid fighting Japan, from the start of the war they tried to recruit members of the Japanese Imperial Army to join them.

Two months after the war began, the Chinese Communists “issued two proclamations.” (Page 133 of The Thought War)

“The first announced that Japanese soldiers were farmers and laborers just like the Chinese”

“The second message … stated that the Chinese and Japanese were friends.” The Chinese Communists “welcomed Japanese soldiers to come over to the Chinese side and work for the Chinese war effort.”

“The achievements of the Chinese Communist propaganda aimed at the Japanese military proved so nimble that it stunned US authorities.” (Page 120 of The Thought War)

The Chinese Communists “implemented a policy of treating Japanese POWs well, thereby hoping to encourage Japanese soldiers to flee to their side.” (Page 128 of The Thought War)

“Japanese POWs were well cared for, fed, provided with a little spending money, and given literature in Chinese to read.” (Page 134 of The Thought War)

The Chinese Communists created a school “to reeducate Japanese POWs.” (Page 134 of The Thought War) The school was run by two men, one Japanese (Sanzō Nosaka), and one Chinese (Wang Xuewen). Wang himself had studied in Japan long before the school was founded.

“Wang had traveled to Japan in 1910 and studied economics at Kyoto Imperial University.”

Though the Japanese were more than eager to interact with the Chinese Communists, they avoided the Russians like the plague.

“In Manchuria, near the end of the war, Japanese military and civilians alike studiously avoided, insofar as possible, surrendering to the Soviets.” (Page 133 of The Thought War)

The Japanese military fights the Nationalists, not the Communists

Throughout the war, the Japanese military focused almost exclusively on destroying the Nationalists and left the Chinese Communists practically untouched.

“the Japanese war plan for 1942 aimed at defeating the KMT army, not the Eighth Route Army.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

(KMT is an abbreviation for the Nationalists. The Eight Route Army was the primary military force for the Chinese Communists.)

For the Japanese military, “the central issue for the solution of the China incident lies in the destruction of Chiang Kai-shek's resistance against Japan.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

During the war, the Nationalists “fought all the major positional battles against the Japanese” (Page 297 of China’s Bitter Victory) The fighting took a heavy toll on the Nationalists, particularly on their best soldiers.

“from the beginning of the war Chiang employed his very best troops, and they suffered the most severe casualties throughout the fighting.” (Page 298 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Chinese Communists fared much during the war.

“while more than ten divisions of KMT troops in the Chungt'iao mountains in southern Shansi north of the Yellow River were easily vanquished by the Japanese, the Eighth Route Army not only survived but succeeded in forging itself into a force eventually strong enough to challenge successfully the supremacy of the KMT in China.” (Page 88 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Mao's plan

Mao told his comrades that Chiang Kai-shek “was their ultimate enemy, and that they must start now preparing to seize power from him.” (Kindle Locations 4450-4451 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“His plan was to ride on the coat-tails of the Japanese to expand Red territory.” (Kindle Locations 4229-4230 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Chinese Communists waited “for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, as the Japanese swept on,” Mao had his soldiers “seize territories behind the Japanese lines.” (Kindle Locations 4226-4227 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The more land Japan took, the better,” Mao said. (Kindle Location 4233 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Japanese military and the Communist New 4th Army (N4A) secretly agreed to leave each other alone.

“For years, Japanese trains ran smoothly, and the N4A expanded quietly.” (Kindle Locations 4591-4595 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

In the first stage of the war, which lasted a little over a year, the Japanese military inflicted heavy losses on the Nationalists. In the second stage of the war, which began at the start of 1939, the Chinese Communists, realizing that the Nationalists were greatly diminished, began to seize territory from them.

“Large-scale engagements were fought behind Japanese lines between Communist and Nationalist forces over territory, in which the Communists usually came off best.” (Kindle Locations 4475-4477 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Not only did the Japanese military leave the Chinese Communists alone, in at least one instance, they fought along their side against the Nationalists.

“the Russian GRU chief in Yenan reported one occasion when Communist troops attacked Nationalist forces in Shandong in summer 1943 ‘in coordination with Japanese troops.’” (Kindle Location 4692 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Not only was Mao able to expand his party under the protection of the Japanese military, Mao was also able to expand his control of the party. In 1942, he launched his Rectification Campaign (cheng-feng) which effectively eliminated all external influence from the party, whether that influence came in the form of Nationalist or Russian spies. All of Mao's enemies were either killed or terrorized into submission.

“Over the period from the beginning of cheng-feng to the convening of the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, the CCP was transformed from an offspring of Soviet communism to an independent Chinese Communist movement led by Mao.” (Page 94 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The secret collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Japanese military did not go unnoticed in Moscow.

“Stalin had been nursing suspicions that Mao might be ‘a Japanese agent.’” (Kindle Locations 4311-4312 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

In reality, the reason the Chinese Communists collaborated with Japan was best encapsulated in a phrase they used at the time, “Use the hand of the enemy to strike the other enemy.”

We “used the knives of the Japanese to slaughter Nationalists,” said one Chinese Communist intelligence agent. “The Japanese annihilation of the [Nationalist underground army] south of the Yangtze [was one of the] masterpieces of cooperation between the Japanese and our Party.” (Kindle Locations 4583-4588 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Collaboration with Japanese intelligence

As the quote suggests, the collaboration between Japan and the Chinese Communists included their intelligence officials.

“in September 1939 Mao initiated a long, close and little-known collaboration with Japanese intelligence, in the hope of further sabotaging Chiang—and preserving his own forces.” (Kindle Locations 4570-4574 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

On the Chinese side, the operation was run by Pan Han-nian. His counterpart from Japan was Eiichi Iwai, a senior intelligence officer and the Japanese vice-consul in Shanghai.

“Pan supplied Iwai with information about Chiang’s ability to resist the Japanese, his conflicts with the CCP and his relations with foreign powers, as well as about US and British agents in Hong Kong and Chongqing. This intelligence rated high with the Japanese: one item reportedly sent the Japanese ambassador to China ‘wild with joy.’” (Kindle Locations 4576-4582 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

The Nationalists emerge from the war in poor shape

“the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek emerged victorious, but in such a gravely weakened condition that it was soon defeated by the Chinese Communist party in the ensuing civil conflict.” (Page 295 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Communists emerge from the war much better off than before

“the fortunes of the CCP were greatly bolstered during the course of the war.” (Page 296 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Their army, “a mere 40,000 men as of 1937, grew to over a million men in 1945. The population of the Communist-controlled areas increased from 1.5 million to over 100 million, and the original territory of 92,000 square kilometers expanded to 950,000 square kilometers in nineteen resistance bases.” (Page 79 of China’s Bitter Victory)

The Japanese military paved the way for the Chinese Communists to seize power in 1949.

“Mao Tse-tung himself quite openly admitted this in 1964, when he brushed off the attempted apologies of a group of Japanese socialists who were visiting Peking and acknowledged that the Sino-Japanese War had been his path to power.” (Page 297 of China’s Bitter Victory)

Japanese weapons for the Chinese Communists

The Japanese military continued to play a pivotal role in China after the war officially ended.

“the entire issue of to whom and under what circumstances the Japanese forces would surrender had significant impact on the outcome of the Chinese civil war that followed Japan’s withdrawal.” (Page 138 of The Thought War)

“The United States wanted to disarm Japan and repatriate everyone as soon as possible, but the Chinese Communists wanted to obtain the weapons the Japanese were supposed to surrender.” (Page 137 of The Thought War)

Tang Enbo, the man in charge of Nationalist forces in Shanghai, declared that “instead of turning all of their weapons over to” him in accordance with the surrender agreements, “the Japanese military in Shanghai secretly were sending them to the Chinese Communists.” (Page 515 of Staying On)

In Manchuria, the Japanese Kwantung Army surrendered to the Russians a gigantic arsenal which the Russians, in turn, promptly handed over to the Chinese Communists.

This “included 7,000 rifles, 11,000 light machine guns, 3,000 heavy machine guns, 1,800 pieces of heavy artillery, 2,500 mortars and grenade launchers, 700 tanks, and nearly 900 airplanes, as well as 800 supply dumps and ammunition depots, and a flotilla of warships on the Sungari river in northern Manchuria.” (Page 514 of Staying On)

“The result was a twofold increase in the number of rifles and automatic weapons in the possession of the Communists, a threefold increase in their artillery, and a more than twentyfold increase in the ammunition available to them.” (Page 514 of Staying On)

All this firepower, however, would have been worthless unless someone trained the Chinese Communists in the proper maintenance and use of the equipment. Here too, the Japanese Imperial Army came to the rescue.

“the Russians secretly transferred tens of thousands of Japanese POWs to the CCP. These troops played a major role in turning the ragtag Communist army into a formidable battle machine, and were crucial in training Red forces to use the Japanese arms on which they chiefly depended, as well as for servicing and repairing these weapons. It was Japanese, too, who founded the CCP air force, with Japanese pilots serving as flight instructors. Thousands of well-trained Japanese medical staff brought the Red wounded a new level of professional and much-welcomed treatment. Some Japanese troops even took part in combat operations.” (Kindle Location 6094 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“These former Japanese troops were extremely useful to the Communists because their level of technical expertise was usually higher than that of other Communist soldiers. For example, in the battle for Tientsin in 1949, most of the artillery employed by the Communists was manned by Japanese gunners.” (Page 511 of Staying On)

Other postwar activities by the Japanese military

“American newsmen in Shanghai reported that in December 1945 there was functioning in that city a Japanese underground comprised on terrorists belonging to the Black Dragon Society and fanatical members of what had been Japanese military intelligence whose aim was to promote civil war in China” (Page 515 of Staying On)

“in many of the cities they occupied, the Japanese systematically wrecked scores of factories before the Americans had time to fly in Chiang Kai-shek’s troops” (Page 515 of Staying On)

America saves the Communists

Despite the extensive help given to them by the Japanese military, the Chinese Communists were not quite ready to confront the Nationalists when the war ended. They needed a few more months to prepare. If nothing else, they certainly needed to learn how to use all the new Japanese military equipment they just acquired. The Nationalists almost defeated them.

“Mao was on the ropes. Then he was rescued—by the Americans.” (Kindle Location 5982 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Right at that moment, George Marshall performed “a monumental service” for the Chinese Communists. He “put heavy—and decisive—pressure on Chiang to stop pursuing the Communists into northern Manchuria.” (Kindle Locations 6042-6044 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang agreed to a ceasefire right “when Mao had become resigned to abandoning” his last major city in Manchuria “and dispersing his army into guerrilla units.” (Kindle Locations 6049-6050 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Marshall’s diktat was probably the single most important decision affecting the outcome of the civil war. The Reds who experienced that period, from Lin Biao to army veterans, concurred in private that this truce was a fatal mistake on Chiang’s part. Had he pressed on, then at the very least he might have prevented the Reds establishing a large and secure base on the Soviet border, with rail links with Russia, over which huge amounts of heavy artillery were brought in.” (Kindle Location 6052 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The Founder of Chiang’s FBI, Chen Li-fu, told us that the Nationalists had no designs on Mao’s life ‘because the Americans guaranteed his safety.’” (Kindle Locations 5835-5836 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Russian aid

Unlike in Southeast Asia, where the West was blindsided by the independence movements fostered by Japan, in China, they actually wanted the Chinese Communists to defeat their former allies, the Nationalists. The West wanted to isolate China after the war to prevent the country from getting stronger. To do that, they too aided the Chinese Communists which helped them seize power. And then once the Chinese Communists seized power, the West loudly proclaimed that Communism was evil. Communist countries were evil. They should be dealt with harshly to prevent them from expanding their influence.

Even though the West would have preferred for Wang Ming to seize control of the Chinese Communist Party, they were content to allow Mao Zedong lead the party. For them, this was preferable to having the Nationalists destroy the Chinese Communists, as the West had no excuse for isolating the Nationalists. The Nationalists were, after all, the ones who just spent the previous eight years fighting Japan alongside the West.

The Russians provided extensive aid to the Chinese Communists.

“During the truce, the Russians opened at least sixteen major military institutions, including air force, artillery and engineering schools. Many Chinese officers went to Russia for training” (Kindle Location 6086 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“the Russians supervised the repair of more than 10,000 km of track and 120 major bridges. This railway system was critical in allowing the Communists to move vast numbers of troops, and heavy artillery, at speed, to attack the main cities that autumn.” (Kindle Location 6108 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

None of this aid came for free, however.

“A secret agreement was reached for the CCP to send Russia one million tons of food every year. The result was famine and deaths from starvation in some areas of China occupied by the Communists.” (Kindle Location 6118 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang the western stooge

Japan would have preferred to avoid China becoming isolated. Aside from the moral objections, the isolation of China eliminated an ever promising market for Japanese exports. In a perfect world, Japan would have opposed having the Communists taking control of China. But a perfect world did not exist in 1937. At that time, the most influential domestic force in China was the Nationalists, an organization run by Chiang Kai-shek. Like Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee, Chiang was the prototypical stooge of the West. Having him in charge of China was a disaster for Japan. They needed to find someone else. The only other option that the West would accept was the Chinese Communists. Japan made the best out of a bad situation and did what was necessary to bring them to power and to gain their favor.

That Chiang was the ultimate stooge of the West can be seen in the way he ran the civil war with the Communists after Japan surrendered. Were he not a stooge, he would have tried to win the war. He did not do that. Aside from agreeing to a ceasefire at the start of the civil war, Chiang had his forces implement a baffling set of policies during the war that ultimately guaranteed his defeat.

His primary mistake was his selection of commanders. He picked the worse possible officers. Once those officers proved their incompetence time and time and again, he refused to replace them. And to top it all off, after they failed completely and spectacularly, Chiang protected them from those who wanted to discipline them.

One of his generals was Hu Tsung-nan. Hu repeatedly isolated small groups of his soldiers from his main force. This allowed the Communists to swoop in and destroy those small groups one at a time.

“Chiang knew that Hu wrecked everything he touched.” (Kindle Location 6242 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang wrote that Hu was “following the same fatal road again and again.” (Kindle Location 6244 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“And yet, when Hu disingenuously offered his resignation, Chiang turned it down” (Kindle Location 6244 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Hu’s incompetence resulted in the deaths of “many hundreds of thousands of troops.” (Kindle Location 6261 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Once the Nationalists were banished to Taiwan, there was an effort to impeach Hu. But the effort “failed, thanks to Chiang’s protection.” (Kindle Locations 6262-6263 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Chiang put Wei Li-huang in charge of his forces in Manchuria.

“Chiang had not only been told that Wei was a Communist agent, but actually suspected this to be true.” (Kindle Location 6268 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

One wonders why Chiang would knowingly make one of his enemies the commander of his forces.

“The reason Wei was brought back in 1948 and given such a crucial job was that Chiang was frantically trying to woo the Americans, who thought highly of Wei’s performance in Burma and regarded him as an important ‘liberal.’” (Kindle Location 6276 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

According to William Stokes, the former U.S. vice-consul in Shenyang, Chiang appointed Wei “in a futile attempt to gain more American equipment and funding, because Wei was recognized by the Americans as a proven military leader.” (Kindle Location 6278 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

Wei was indeed a communist agent. His actions brought further disaster to the Nationalists. But rather than punish Wei for his actions, Chiang “let Wei go, and he sailed off unmolested to Hong Kong.” (Kindle Location 6289 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

That America made Chiang appoint a known Communist as the leader of his forces proves that America wanted the Communists to win the war. And it proves that, for Chiang, placating his American masters was his highest priority. And that makes him the ultimate stooge of the West.

Stalin conspires with the West to isolate China

After losing the civil war to the Communists, the Nationalists were banished to the island of Taiwan. The Chinese Communists wanted to invade Taiwan to destroy the Nationalists and complete their takeover of China. But the Russians refused to help them.

“Mao asked Stalin for Soviet-crewed planes and submarines to help take Taiwan in 1950 or ‘even earlier,’ telling Stalin that the CCP had a large number of well-placed moles who had ‘fled’ there with Chiang. Stalin, however, was not prepared to risk a direct confrontation with America in such a high-visibility, high-tension area, and Mao had to shelve his plan, allowing Chiang to turn Taiwan into an island stronghold.” (Kindle Locations 6567-6570 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

On the surface, Stalin's reasoning seems absurd. Why would America, after helping the Chinese Communists conquer over 99% of China, suddenly object to their conquering the last tiny bit? As long as the Nationalists remained alive, even if constrained to an insignificant area, that allowed the West to recognize the Nationalists as the one true government of China. This, in turn, allowed the West to monopolize the newly formed UN Security Council, where all five of the permanent members were white, except one. The sole exception was China. But China, at that time, was run by Chiang Kai-shek whom, as we have seen, was the ultimate western stooge, willing to do whatever the West desired. In effect, the West had complete control of the Security Council. However, were the Chinese Communists to obliterate the Nationalists, the West would either have to allow the Chinese Communists to join the Security Council, or simply reduce the number of permanent members to four. Neither option was appealing for them. Had they allowed the Chinese Communists into the Security Council, that would have ended their monopoly of power. Had they reduced the number of permanent members to four, the Council would have literally become a white's only club, which was something the West wanted to avoid.

Misc.

“We’ve been thinking of renaming our Party, of calling it not ‘Communist’ but something else,” said Mao. “Then the situation … will be more favorable, especially with the Americans” (Kindle Locations 6005-6007 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

General Carton de Wiart said that he did “not consider that [the Reds] contributed much towards defeating the Japs” (Kindle Locations 5850-5851 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“The Soviet occupation forces carted off whole factories and machinery as ‘war booty,’ and even demolished industrial installations. The equipment removed by the Russians was estimated to be worth US $858 million (US $2 billion at current replacement cost).” (Kindle Locations 5818-5820 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“When Stalin dispatched General Chuikov as his new military adviser to Chongqing at this time, Chuikov asked why he was being sent ‘to Chiang Kai-shek, not the Chinese Red Army.’ Stalin answered: ‘Your job is firmly to tie the hands of the Japanese aggressor in China.’” (Kindle Locations 4674-4676 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

“Many of the CCP and KMT leaders had also studied in Japan and still held Japan in high esteem, even if they despised the current political and military regime. These Chinese had developed personal relations with individual Japanese in the course of their studies and research abroad. In addition, since 1895 many Chinese had, for better or worse, regarded Japan as a model of modernity. The small country provided a glimpse of the power China might achieve if it could successfully modernize.” (Page 154 of The Thought War)

“Mao never made any comment, then or later, about this,” (Kindle Locations 4273-4274 from Mao: The Unknown Story)

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