The linkage
“One of the principal tasks of statesmanship is to understand which subjects are truly related and can be used to reinforce each other,” said Henry Kissinger. “For the most part, the policymaker has little choice in the matter; ultimately, it is reality, not policy, that links events. The statesman’s role is to recognize the relationship when it does exist – in other words, to create a network of incentives and penalties to produce the most favorable outcome.” (Page 182 of Cold War Frontiers)
After the official end of World War II, the linkage was between the progress made by the independence movements fostered by Japan and the terms of the peace treaty imposed on Japan. The West hoped to coax Japan into somehow restraining those independence movements by threatening to seize various parts of her territory, notably Okinawa, the Nanpo Islands, the Kuriles, and Takeshima.
Okinawa
“Both Chinese governments claim that Senkaku should have been included in the "Taiwan" that Japan renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, whereas the Japanese government contends that they were part of Okinawa, a territory of Japan.” (Page 52 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Kuriles
The Kurile Islands themselves are fairly small. Their importance lies not in their size, but in the waters surrounding them.
“The waters around them, at the confluence of warm and cold currents, abound in fish and other marine products, and are among the world's best fishing grounds.” (Page 72 of Cold War Frontiers)
Whoever owns the islands, controls those fishing areas.
The agreements setting the border between Russia and Japan were originally set in the second half of the 19th century. In 1855, Japan and Russia signed the Shimoda Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation.
“It set the boundary between Iturup (Etorofu) and Urup, the same as the border that Japan is currently claiming. The treaty also stipulated that the island of Sakhalin would be open to settlement by both nations.” (Page 73 of Cold War Frontiers)
Allowing both Russians and Japanese to reside on Sakhalin did not work out well. To resolve the issue, the two countries signed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1875. Russia took complete control of Sakhalin in exchange for handing over all the Kuriles to Japan.
Unlike Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan, Japan did not gain control of the Kuriles through the use of her military. Russia had no right to claim the islands after the war. Indeed, their claim violated the promise the Allies made in Cairo to refrain from territorial expansion.
“Although Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration (August 15) and signed the Instrument of Surrender (September 2), the Yalta Agreement had not then been revealed, and Japan had never agreed to it,” said the Japanese government. “Thus, Japan should invoke the principle of ‘no territorial expansion,’ and need not give up the Kurile Islands, because they did not become Japanese as a result of war.” (Page 80 of Cold War Frontiers)
Antarctica
Antarctica was important for the same reason that the Kuriles were important.
“The surrounding seas abound in whales, seals, and fish,” (Page 125 of Cold War Frontiers)
Unlike the Kuriles, however, no other country ever recognized Japan as owning any part of Antarctica. Japan hoped to change that. Before World War II began, there was an effort to seize part of the continent “on the grounds that if Japan did not claim a portion of Antarctica, it might be deprived of land bases necessary for the operations of its whaling fleet.” (Page 127 of Cold War Frontiers)
After the war, in the run-up to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, there was an active campaign “for international recognition of Japan's alleged right to a slice of the Antarctic.” (Page 136 of Cold War Frontiers) This campaign was opposed by both New Zealand and Australia.
“After the war both countries tried to influence the USA to prevent Japanese whalers from returning to the Antarctic.” (Page 136 of Cold War Frontiers)
The issue of who owned the Antarctic was brought to the forefront by the actions of Britain, Argentina, and Chile.
“Shortly after the Second World War, international relations deteriorated over conflicting territorial claims to Antarctica, between the UK, on the one hand, and Argentina and Chile on the other.” (Page 127 of Cold War Frontiers)
In all likelihood, while those countries appeared to be fighting each other over this issue, in reality they were secretly collaborating with one another. They were pushing this issue onto the international scene as a threat, a threat to slice up the Antarctic region in a way that would exclude Japanese whalers. As in the case of Okinawa and the Kuriles, the West was threatening to exclude Japan from Antarctica if the ongoing wars of independence succeeded.
Takeshima
“As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane prefecture of Japan,” said Dean Rusk. (Page 44 of Cold War Frontiers)
During the war
As the war progressed, as it became more and more evident what Japan was doing in Southeast Asia, the terms the West was willing to offer Japan progressively became more harsh. But in the first half of the war, the terms the West was considering were more lenient. On July 2, 1943, the State Department argued that Japanese possession of Okinawa would not pose a threat as long as Japan was disarmed and returned Taiwan and Korea. (Page 162 of Cold War Frontiers) They would change their tune once they realized what Japan was doing in Southeast Asia.
In many cases, the U.S. government apparently made no judgement at all until the later stages of the war. For Antarctica, a State Department document written on November 12, 1942 simply discussed the various claims to the region. The document did not contain any recommendations for how Japan’s claims should be dealt with. (Page 128 of Cold War Frontiers) In November 1943, Stalin and Roosevelt discussed the disposition of the Kuriles, though they apparently made no final judgement on the issue. (Page 80 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Greater East Asia Conference
The Greater East Asia Conference was held on November 5 and 6, 1943. The conference was attended by Manchukuo, China, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines. (Page 19 of Changing Visions of East Asia)
For the West, the granting of independence to the Philippines, China, Thailand, and Manchukuo was not controversial. All of those countries were either independent to begin with or they were countries which the West wanted to grant independence to after the war. Manchukuo, more commonly known as Manchuria, was the country Japan created out of the northeast section of China. After the war, the county would be absorbed into China. China and Thailand were both technically independent countries before the war and would remain so afterwards. The Philippines was a colony of America before the war. But in 1934, America promised to grant the Philippines independence in a decade. For Japan to support the independence to the four of the countries who attended the conference then, was a move that the West would support.
The last country, Myanmar, was a British colony. In all likelihood, the British wanted to keep Myanmar. But, judging from what happened after the war, of the the European colonies in the region, Myanmar was the one which Europe was the least attached to, the most willing to surrender. The colonies which Europe most wanted to keep were India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Indochina (which consists of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). None of those countries which Europe most wanted to keep were granted full participation during the conference. This was not a coincidence.
The Cairo Conference
Three weeks after the Greater East Asia Conference ended, the Allies met on November 27 in what became known as the Cairo Conference. After the conference ended, the Allies issued a communique which proclaimed that the Allies would not annex territory from Japan after the war.
The Allies “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”
That the Cairo Conference immediately followed the Greater East Asia Conference was, in my opinion, no coincidence. That the Allies promised not to annex territory from Japan was their reward to Japan for not making Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Indochina full participants in the Greater East Asia Conference, for not using the conference to proclaim the independence and liberation of those colonies. As long as Japan refrained from doing anything to support the independence of those colonies, I believe, the West was committed to not annexing territory from Japan. Japan, however, had no intention of allowing the West to keep those colonies (with the possible exception of Malaysia). Japan would indeed liberate all those colonies (except Malaysia). Once the West realized what Japan was up to, they would go back on their word and violate their promise not to annex territory from Japan.
Before Yalta
Starting in the fall of 1944, the West began considering more restrictive terms for Japan. A State Department document completed on August 29 said Japan should renounce any claim to Antarctica. (Page 129 of Cold War Frontiers) Curiously, on that same day the Japanese government began discussing whether to grant independence to Indonesia. (Page 87 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) The discussions ended a few days later, on September 2 with the decision to grant Indonesia independence. (Page 87 of Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia) A public announcement of this decision was made shortly thereafter.
On December 14, the State Department suggested that Japan keep Okinawa unless the Chinese government makes a strong case for taking Okinawa during the peace negotiations or if the people of Okinawa do not want to be part of Japan. In either of those two cases, an international commission should be created to look at the problem. The document also recommends the creation of bases on Okinawa “under the authority of a General International Organization.” (Page 163 of Cold War Frontiers)
This suggests that America was thinking about either having the Nationalists claim Okinawa and use that as a pretext to take Okinawa away from Japan, or were thinking about fomenting an independence movement in Okinawa. Or they were considering essentially seizing the islands themselves using the UN as a disguise and establishing bases there. None of these options would be appealing to Japan. That America was thinking about these options indicates that they had some idea about what Japan was doing in Southeast Asia. They were getting nervous. And they were thinking about different ways they could pressure Japan into terminating those independence movements. Indeed, after the war, Chiang Kai-shek did demand that Japan hand over Okinawa to him. Once he made this claim, America could tell Japan that they were thinking about giving Okinawa to the Nationalists unless Japan ended the independence movements in the Far East. They did something similar by building U.S. bases on Okinawa. They told Japan that they needed to have control of Okinawa for the security of the region. As long as the communists were a threat, America needed to keep Okinawa. However, if the communist threat vanished, so would the need for the American occupation of Okinawa. As subsequent events show, the communist threat that America cared about was the Viet Minh, who weren't really even communists. Once the situation in Vietnam was resolved, America was willing to hand over Okinawa.
Yalta
The Yalta Conference was held from February 4 to 11, 1945. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met each other.
“A secret agreement was made there to cede South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the USSR in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan.” (Page 18 of Cold War Frontiers)
This agreement was a violation of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration in which the Allies agreed not to annex territory after the war. The attack was also a violation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality pact, which prohibited Russia and Japan from fighting one another. That neutrality agreement was “not due to expire until April 1946.” (Page 18 of Cold War Frontiers)
Potsdam
The Potsdam Declaration was issued on July 26, 1945.
“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”
The last seven words of that sentence, “and such minor islands as we determine,” are particularly important. Those words left the Allies with “room for future interpretation.” (Page 76 of Cold War Frontiers) The Allies could, in the future, either confiscate or return many of the small islands which previously belonged to Japan depending on how Japan behaved.
The war was all but over. Yet the West felt they need to hold some leverage over Japan. They felt they had to threaten Japan by threatening to confiscate more territory from Japan. One cannot argue that the West was merely waiting for the final surrender of Japan, for that happened on September. Yet the San Francisco Peace Treaty was not signed until six years later.
In the surrender agreement they signed, “Japan accepted the Cairo and Potsdam terms.” (Page 17 of Cold War Frontiers) However, they never accepted the Yalta agreement, which gave the Kuriles to Russia.
1946
With nearly all of the Far East in revolution, a revolution ignited by Japan, the West decided to retaliate at the start of 1946. On January 22, the Joint Chiefs of Staff demanded that America take control of Okinawa and the Nanpo Islands through a strategic trusteeship. (Page 110 of Cold War Frontiers)
On January 29, the press revealed that, at Yalta, the Allies had secretly agreed to hand over the Kuriles to Russia. (Page 75 of Cold War Frontiers) On that same day, America removed Okinawa, the Bonin Islands, Takeshima, the Kuriles from Japanese administration. This move was not a final border demarcation. (Page 25 and 162 of Cold War Frontiers) The change was a threat. Halt the independence movements in the Far East, or we will take these territories away from you. A few days later, on February 2, Russia annexed the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. (Page 78 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Allies hoped to complete their peace treaty with Japan in 12 to 18 months. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/02/05/93035200.html) This suggests that they believed the revolutions throughout the region would end by that time. They were sorely mistaken.
In a report completed on May 24, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that America should annex Micronesia, annex Marcus Island, and place Okinawa and the Nanpo Islands under strategic trusteeship. (Page 110 of Cold War Frontiers)
On June 7, Aung San led a protest of 50,000 people who demand independence from Britain. There was a guerrilla war raging through Myanmar at this time. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F50711FB3F5C107A93CAA9178DD85F428485F9) Perhaps in retaliation for this, two weeks later, on June 22, America forced Japan to forfeit Takeshima. (Page 25 of Cold War Frontiers)
On June 24, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee argued that Korea should have Takeshima, Russia should have the Kuriles, Japan should renounce its claims to the Spratly Islands and Antarctic. But they argued that Japan should keep Okinawa. They argued against creating U.S. bases on Okinawa. They argued that America should obtain a trusteeship for Micronesia, Marcus Island, and the Bonin and Volcano Islands. (Page 25, 81, 129, 164, and 165 of Cold War Frontiers)
From the last week of May to the last week of June, the position of the U.S. governments seems to have changed on Okinawa. In May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that America should obtain Okinawa as a strategic trust. But in June, the SWNCC argued that Japan should keep Okinawa. This discrepancy may simply be the result of a difference of opinion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may simply have been more angry at Japan than the SWNCC.
If, on the other hand, the change represents a real change in policy, then the change was probably the result of what happened in China during the interval between the two recommendations. The temporary truce imposed on the Nationalists by George Marshall began during this period. (www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/timeline/#1946)
During the truce, the Japanese military was busy preparing the Chinese Communists to do battle against the Nationalists. If the change in the status of Okinawa was not a coincidence, then the change was probably a reward for this aid. One might believe that America was foolish for rewarding Japan for doing something that Japan might have done anyways. Japan had aided the Communists against the Nationalists before the truce. Japan probably would have aided the Communists after the truce regardless of what the SWNCC recommended.
However, had America not held out a little bit of bait for Japan, Japan would have thought, "What's the purpose of cooperating? Even if we do what they want, even if we help bring about the outcomes that the West wants, we get nothing in return. We might as well try to screw America wherever possible." The change in Okinawa might have been a message from America. This is what happens when you cooperate with us. When you cooperate with us, we will reward you.
In any event, the change mattered little in the end. America would continually change its policy on Okinawa until right before the peace treaty was completed.
On November 4, a ceasefire order was issued in Indonesia. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/11/05/93173040.html) A week later, on November 12, the Netherlands and Indonesia reached an agreement. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/11/14/93177318.html) The Indonesian rebels would gain control of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. The United States of Indonesia would be created in two years. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1946/11/16/91627187.html) The agreement, today known as the Linggadjati Agreement, was signed on November 15.
The Dutch never had any intention of implementing the agreement. They were merely stalling for time in the hopes of building up their forces in the hopes of reconquering Indonesia.
1947
In the final days of 1946, British offered independence to Myanmar and invited a delegation from that country to Britain to negotiate the terms. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F10E16F93C5F16738FDDA80A94DA415B8688F1D3) The conference began a few weeks later on January 13. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F20A15FF345B157A93C6A8178AD85F438485F9) The two sides reached an agreement two weeks later, on January 27. Myanmar would gain independence. But before officially becoming independent, Myanmar would form a new government, the centerpiece of which was the Constituent Assembly. Elections for this body were set for April. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F00A17FC3558157A93CAAB178AD85F438485F9)
Micronesia
Micronesia is a group of islands which were given to Japan after World War I. With Japan’s defeat in World War II, that left the question of what should be done with the islands. Early in 1947, America decided to ask the UN for trusteeship of the islands. Under such a trusteeship, America would have control of the islands until at some point in the future when America would grant them independence.
Australia favored U.S. control of Micronesia. But they objected strenuously to resolving the issue before signing a peace treaty with Japan. The disposition of Micronesia, they thought, should be resolved as part of the treaty.
“The Australian Government does not regard this as an isolated question but as an integral part of a comprehensive settlement for the entire Pacific ocean area,” said Ambassador Makin. “To isolate the question of mandated islands from the settlement with Japan as a whole is, in the opinion of my Government, an approach almost untenable both politically and juridically.” (Page 118 to 119 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The Australian Government regards both the timing and the procedure as erroneous and believes that the course proposed by the United States will have the effect of adding to the difficulties of achieving their objective.” (Page 119 of Cold War Frontiers)
Britain felt the same way. Their ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, said “it would be premature at this stage” to resolve the issue. (Page 118 of Cold War Frontiers) They said the issue should not be resolved “in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan.”
Even Russia objected to solving the problem early.
“The question of trusteeship over the islands formerly under Japanese mandate, as well as over any Japanese islands, must be considered by the Allied Powers in the peace settlement in regard to Japan,” said the Russian government (Page 116 of Cold War Frontiers)
Despite the objections from her erstwhile Allies, on February 26, America went ahead and asked the UN Security Council to make Micronesia a strategic trust under its control. (Page 103 of Cold War Frontiers) The security council granted this request about a month later, on April 2. (Page 103 of Cold War Frontiers)
Though Japan may have not been happy to see America gain control of the islands, at least the control was legally a temporary arrangement. At some point in the future, America would have to grant independence to the islands. The war was for the liberation from western control. An arrangement by which the West would annex territory would have been unacceptable.
The solution to Micronesia was a compromise. Not full immediate independence as Japan wanted. But not annexation like the West wanted.
One would have thought that America would have done what Russia, Britain, and Australia requested. Defer the final judgement until the final peace treaty with Japan. That way America would still have leverage over Japan. By resolving the issue early, America lost that leverage. America could no longer threaten to annex Micronesia. America must have received something in return for resolving this issue early.
2/28
Two days after America asked the security council for a strategic trust for Micronesia, on Taiwan, the Nationalists began a massacre of civilians which became known as the 2/28 Massacre. Tens of thousands of people were killed. The purpose of this massacre was to eliminate Japanese influence from Taiwan. Taiwan had been a Japanese colony since the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Like Korea, after the war, the West was determined to eliminate that influence.
To justify their actions, the Nationalists staged an incident which gave them a pretext to massacre those who were connected to Japan. There was a lady selling cigarettes in a park. A group of government officials accused her of selling cigarettes without paying any taxes. They seized her money and the products she was selling. A scuffle ensued in which she was beaten. The people who witnessed this were outraged. Riots erupted.
Though the 2/28 Massacre is known for the date February 28, the real massacre took place after the 28th. The Nationalists used the riots they had created as a pretext to slaughter those whom they thought might have close connections to Japan. Pai Chung-hsi “managed occasionally to imply that” the Formosans were “tainted by the Japanese.” (Page 314 of Formosa Betrayed) He declared that “the island was spoiled by the presence of Formosan riff-raff schooled by Japan to be tools of aggression in China proper.” (Page 315 of Formosa Betrayed) America felt the same way. The State Department “shared the Chinese view that Formosans were ‘tainted’ by long association with the Japanese.” (Page 330 of Formosa Betrayed)
The Nationalists began their crackdown on March 8. (Page 291 of Formosa Betrayed) Nationalist troops from the mainland arrived in Taiwan that morning.
“With these troops came suitable equipment, most of it of American origin,” said “A hasty paint job did not hide the clearly marked original lettering on the vehicles.” (Page 292 of Formosa Betrayed)
“To the last there was expectation that surely the United States would intervene” (Page 306 of Formosa Betrayed)
Rather than stop the massacre, America covered it up. This shows that the U.S. Government secretly approved of the killings. One American official, who had just returned from Taiwan, whitewashed what was going on there.
“The most constructive efforts I saw in Chinese areas that I visited were going on in Formosa ... There may have been disorders there recently, but it seems that the Chinese Government has sent some of its most efficient administrators to the Island. Being separated from the uncertainties of the Chinese mainland, the island was making distinct progress.” (Page 318 of Formosa Betrayed)
This official made these observations towards the end of March “while the bloody reprisals were at their height and the island was paralyzed by fear.” (Page 318 of Formosa Betrayed) This shows you what our idea of “distinct progress” was.
“Here was the betrayal in its most simple terms; the Formosans looked to us for help, we armed and financed the Nationalists, and the Nationalists were making sure, if they could, that there would be no more appeals to the United States and ‘democracy.’” (Page 306 to 307 of Formosa Betrayed)
Overjoyed that Japan would allow them to slaughter the remnants of Japanese influence on Taiwan without retaliation, America took an important step in making the ultimate peace terms more favorable for Japan. In March, the Policy Planning Section was created. (Page 27 of Cold War Frontiers) PPS was a subsection of the State Department. They would take a less severe approach to the peace treaty. They were not immediately involved in Japan issues however. They were working on the reconstruction of Europe through May. The first signs that they were involved in the Japanese peace treaty appeared in August.
On March 25, in the Netherlands, the Lower House ratified a modified version of the Linggadjati Agreement. The modifications were not acceptable to Indonesia.
March 1947 drafts
On March 6, the prime minister of France, Paul Ramadier, declared that his country had “reached a turning-point in Indo-China.”
(select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60B16F63B5A1B7B93C5A91788D85F438485F9) Relations between France and Vietnam were now entering a “constructive phase.” Negotiation would now supercede military action.
“It is not by force that the problem can be settled,” he said.
The State Department prepared a draft peace treaty in March 1947. The draft was apparently completed on the 19th. (Page 82 of Cold War Frontiers) The draft was very punitive. Japan would be forced to renounced the Bonin Islands and Okinawa. (Page 166 of Cold War Frontiers) America was apparently hoping to pressure Japan into forcing the Indonesian and Vietnamese rebels into surrendering.
On July 21, the Dutch launched an offensive in Indonesia called Operation Product. The operation lasted two weeks, until August 4.
“In July, 1947, the reinforced Dutch Army lashed out in what it called a ‘police action,’ and in two weeks had reduced Republican-held territory on Java to less than half the island and had made inroads on Sumatra,” said the New York Times. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/10/03/223856232.html)
On July 18, the Indian Independence Act of 1947, an act passed by the British government, an act which split British India into Pakistan and India, was enacted. The following day, the British had Aung San assassinated. The assassination was undoubtedly retaliation against Japan for being forced to grant independence to India.
August 1947 draft
The day after the Dutch “police action” ended in Indonesia, America finished writing a new draft for the peace treaty with Japan. In this version, Japan kept the Northern Territories. This version is very detailed with Lat / Lon. Japan would renounce “all territorial claims in the Antarctic.” Japan would keep Okinawa but forfeit the Bonins. (Page 83, 131, and 166 of Cold War Frontiers)
The U.S. military vociferously objected to Japan keeping Okinawa. (Page 166 of Cold War Frontiers)
The draft was a reaction to the events in Indonesia and India. The West was angry at Japan for forcing them to grant independence to India (India became independent on August 15). On the other hand, the West was happy they could split India in such a way that it would be in a state of perpetual conflict with Pakistan. And they were happy that Japan allowed them to seize more of Indonesia in the Dutch “police action.”
Policy Planning Staff
“The August 1947 draft however met with criticism by the Policy Planning Section (PPS), newly established in March of that year, with the architect of the ‘containment’ policy, George Kennan, as Director. Having finished drafting the Marshall Plan in May, the PPS had just started to work on policy toward Japan.” (Page 27 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Early drafts, based on wartime State Department studies, generally reflected the ‘punitive peace’ plan… US peace treaty drafting reached its first turning point with the introduction of Cold War thinking by the PPS, under George Kennan, the initiator of the ‘containment’ policy. Japan became central to US Asia strategy, and the terms for peace with it changed from ‘punitive’ to ‘generous.’ Economic recovery of Japan and installation of a Japanese government friendly to the USA became a primary objective of the US occupation.” (Page 49 of Cold War Frontiers)
By the fall, it had become apparent that negotiations between Vietnam and the French were going nowhere. On September 10, France made their “last appeal” to the rebels. Vietnam would be independent but would remain within the French Union. France would get to control foreign policy and have military bases in Vietnam. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1947/09/11/104336574.html) This solution was not acceptable to the Vietnamese. The war would continue.
With the negotiations in tatters, America began to make their peace terms for Japan more stringent again. On October 14, George Kennan proposed two options for Okinawa. Okinawa could become a strategic trusteeship of America or America should have military bases on Okinawa for the long-term. (Page 83 and 167 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific) In this proposal, we can begin to see the outlines of the situation that Okinawa would be entrapped in for the next two decades. With a solution nowhere in sight, at least no solution acceptable to the West, America would hold Okinawa as their hostage. As long as the war was going on, America would maintain military bases on Okinawa “for the defense of the region.” On the other hand, were the French to be defeated quickly, before the peace treaty was signed, America would have surely demanded that Okinawa be removed from Japan by placing the islands under a U.S. strategic trusteeship.
Kennan maintained the same position on the Northern Territories as the August draft, which was more favorable to Japan than previous drafts and more favorable than the ultimate solution. He would soon be overruled, however. On November 19 and January 8, the State Department finished writing two separate drafts for a peace treaty with Japan. Though these drafts have different dates, from what I can tell, the contents of the drafts are identical. In these drafts, Russia would gain control of the Kuriles, though the drafts say that Japan has a stronger case for keeping the Habomais and Shikotan. (Page 28, 84, 131, and 167 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific) The position on Okinawa was essentially the same one that Kennan had mentioned, namely that “the Ryukyus south of 29° north latitude would be placed under United States control … the exact form of which is still being studied.” (Page 59 of Cold War Frontiers)
By November, all the concessions made in the August draft had been revoked. From this, we can see that the concessions were made in the hopes of securing a favorable solution to Indonesia and Vietnam. But when it became clear that no solution was forthcoming, the concessions were revoked.
Myanmar formally gained its independence on January 4. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F60E14FC3455157B93C6A9178AD85F4C8485F9) It appears that the West had hoped to reach resolve their problems with all of Southeast Asia by this time. And once that happened, they would sign a peace treaty with Japan. But once they failed to achieve that goal, once they realized that their problems in Indonesia and Vietnam would continue for a while, they decided to stop working on the peace treaty and wait until the situation in Southeast Asia was resolved.
One wonders why America would go through the process of drafting two peace treaties, one in November and one in January, and, from what I can tell, have them end up being exactly the same. In all likelihood, from November to January, America was waiting to see if there was any progress anywhere in the Far East. There was not. The West hoped for some progress in Vietnam. On November 7, France predicted that there would be peace in Vietnam by Christmas. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1947/11/08/104366845.html) This was not an accurate predication. On the other hand, the situation did not really deteriorate for the West either, and so the peace terms remained unchanged. For Indonesia, negotiations with the Dutch began on December 8. Though an agreement, the Renville Agreement, was signed on January 17, the agreement solved nothing. Both sides were merely biding their time. The Dutch would begin another “police action” at the end of the year.
On March 25, George Kennan wrote a now famous report called PPS/28, “Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan.” In the report, he argued that the peace treaty should be delayed. For the moment, America should focus on the economic recovery of Japan to secure it for the Western bloc. And indeed the efforts to complete a peace treaty were put on hold until the fall of the next year. He recommended that America establish permanent bases on Okinawa. (Page 28 and 167 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific) This recommendation would quickly be changed, however. Only two months later, on May 26, the report was revised. The status of U.S. bases on Okinawa was changed from permanent to long-term. (Page 29 and 167 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific)
The change from permanent to long-term was undoubtedly welcome in Japan. To understand why the U.S. government flip flopped so quickly on such an important issue one needs to understand what happened in Korea on April 3. The Jeju Massacre began on that date. The West orchestrated that massacre to eliminate a source of resistance which was linked to Japan. Unlike the resistance movements elsewhere which succeeded, in the case of Jeju the West was able to suppress the movement.
The change in PPS/28 may also have been influenced by what happened in Indonesia. Three days after PPS 28/2, the Committee of Good Offices said the cease-fire order in Indonesia had been implemented. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/05/30/85262556.html) I assume that, though the report on the ceasefire did not come out until the 29th, the West was able to verify the implementation of the ceasefire earlier than that. If so, the West may have rewarded Japan for the ceasefire in Indonesia three days earlier, on the 26th. In any event, the changes were not permanent until PPS/28 became official U.S. policy, which did not happen until later. The first step in that direction took place a few days after the report on the ceasefire. On June 2, the National Security Council adopted PPS 28/2. Henceforth the document would be known as NSC 13.
“With the President’s approval of NSC 13, the ‘long-term retention’ of Okinawa became US national policy.” (Page 169 of Cold War Frontiers)
Something else happened in May. The State Department drafted a trusteeship agreement for Antarctica. (Page 130 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Most of the claimants to Antarctica, however, received the US proposal for internationalization unfavorably.” (Page 131 of Cold War Frontiers)
Shortly thereafter, probably in reaction to this U.S. proposal, Chile made an attempt to de-escalate the confrontation between themselves, Britain, and Argentina over Antarctica. Chile proposed “a five-year suspension of the sovereignty problem in order to foster scientific research and to prepare the way for an Antarctic conference.” (Page 128 of Cold War Frontiers.
This proposal was too undoubtedly welcome in Japan and was a reward for what happened in Korea and Indonesia. Nevertheless, few of the conflicts in the Far East were resolved by this point. That meant the West would continue to stall on the peace treaty negotiations for Japan.
On June 1, the State Department sent Sebald the following message, “The Department remains of the opinion that there can be no final determination of Japan's territorial sovereignty in the absence of a peace settlement and that there are meanwhile good reasons for avoiding any expression, implied or direct, of United States views on this subject.” The Department informed its team in Japan that the U.S. was still carefully studying the Northern Territories issue and in the meantime opposes any action which would weaken Japan’s claim. (Page 85 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific)
Had America done anything to damage Japan's claims, that would have invited retaliation from Japan. Japan could have had the independence movements they fostered increase their resistance. On the other hand, had America given in to Japan's demands, Japan would be free to support the independence movements without fear of retaliation. With the situation in Indonesia now quiet, the West decided the best course of action was to say nothing publicly and leave the threat hanging over Japan.
The situation in Indonesia did not remain quiet for long, however. One June 10, the New York Times reported that, after three months of relative quiet, the verbal barrage between Indonesia and the Netherlands resumed at the UN. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/06/11/97152713.html)
The partition of Korea was formalized in the fall of 1948. On August 15, the UN created the Republic of Korea in the south. (Page 21 of Cold War Frontiers) Less than a month later, on September 9, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was inaugurated in North Korea. (Page 22 of Cold War Frontiers) Unlike in other parts of the world, in Northeast Asia, the West was able to implement the plan they had originally conceived. For allowing them to do that, the West rewarded Japan.
The original NSC 13 did not include a policy on reparations. All the document said on this subject was, “Recommendations on reparations are to be submitted shortly.” (digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1948v06.p0794&id=FRUS.FRUS1948v06&isize=M)
In the fall, two more versions of NSC 13 were forthcoming, NSC 13/1 on September 24 and NSC 13/2 on October 7. I have thus far been unable to find a copy of NSC 13/1. But NSC 13/2 is available online here: www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_r/M008/M008-003r.html
There are several sections left blank, the two most important of which were the section on the disposition of Okinawa and the subject of war reparations which Japan must pay. Both these items were the leverage America wanted to use to force Japan to accept its policies in the Far East. Subsequent events will show that what America wanted was to bring the Communists to power in China and to bring the war in Indonesia to an end.
The paragraph which includes long-term U.S. control of both Okinawa and the Nanpo Islands was apparently suggested on October 26, 1948. (digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1948v06.p0890&id=FRUS.FRUS1948v06&isize=M) From what I can tell, this is the first time the Nanpo Islands were suggested to be under long-term control. That the islands would only be under long-term control implies that eventually the islands would be returned to Japan, which indeed happened two decades later. This concession was likely in anticipation of the Communist takeover of China and the upcoming war in Indonesia.
About a week later, on November 5, President Truman adopted the policy recommendations on Japan from the Policy Planning Staff. These recommendations were encapsulated in NSC 13. Peace treaty negotiations would be put on hold until the fall of 1949. (Page 29 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific)
This was likely due to the West waiting for the outcome of the situation in Indonesia and China. About a week later, on November 14, the New York Times reported that the Netherlands would resort to force in Indonesia. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/11/15/85631595.html)
The West was waiting for the outcome of the fighting before signing a peace agreement. The delay was not welcome in Japan. They wanted a peace treaty as soon as possible. And they made their request known to the public at the end of November. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/11/26/88126300.html)
The fighting was already well under way in China. The fighting in the fall was decisive. The Communists were so successful that on January 9, Mao told Stalin that he would be able to launch a new government in the summer or earlier. (Kindle Location 6339 from Mao: The Unknown Story) He was a little bit too optimistic. But only a little bit. He would emerge victorious a few months later, in the fall.
The success of the Communists in China and the partition of Korea apparently led America to abandon its plan to deconcentrate Japanese industry, which America did on December 9, 1948, as the Communists were busy routing the Nationalists. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/12/10/85633441.html) The big industrial conglomerates of Japan would remain intact after the war, with perhaps the only noticeable difference that they were now referred to keiretsu instead of being referred to as zaibatsu.
The Dutch began their final offensive in Indonesia on December 19. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/12/19/96442040.html) Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta are taken into custody. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/12/20/96608628.html) The Dutch hope that the military action will be over in a few days. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/12/20/96608700.html) They were badly mistaken.
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1948/12/31/96695657.html
“began a military action against a people they knew did not have the arms to oppose them. Because of the failure of the United States, and some of the other democracies, in the Security Council to support the only solution that would have brought peace-a return to the status quo ante bellum and a resumption of negotiations under the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement-the Dutch were allowed to hold all their military gains and resume negotiations in a vastly strengthened position.”
“Using that strengthened position to its full possibilities, they proceeded to carve up those portions of the Indies outside the Republic over which they then held control into sixteen states, or areas, instead of the two (East Indonesia and borneo) to which they had agreed at Linggadjati, and which, with the Republic, were to form the United States of Indonesia within a Netherlands Union. Reluctantly signing, under United Nations pressure, the Renville Agreement of last January, they failed to carry out the plebiscites in their territory that were promised and now have set out to destroy the Republic entirely, or at least its leadership. They are doing so by resorting to the old colonial policy of ‘divide and rule.’”
“Had the Republic chosen, in November, 1946, to fight it out instead of depending on world opinion to judge their claims for independence, they might have won. At least they would have had a better chance to win than they had nine months later, when the Dutch had steadily built up their forces.”
By spring, however, the British had finally realized that the war was not going well for the West. On March 9, the New York Times reported that the British were urging the Netherlands to make concessions to Indonesia. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/03/10/84199323.html)
Perhaps, in retaliation for what was happening in Indonesia, on April 2, America told Japan that the dollar should be set at 330 yen. (Page 10 of Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington) At that level, Japanese industry would have a hard time competing. Japan wanted the dollar set at 350 yen. Turns out, what America gave them in the end was even better than that. And they would not have to wait long for this.
On April 23, the Chinese Communists seized “Chiang’s capital, Nanjing, in practice ending twenty-two years of Nationalist rule over the Mainland. On that day, Chiang flew to his ancestral home, Xikou. Knowing that this would probably be his last visit, he spent much of the time kneeling by his mother’s tomb, praying in tears.” (Kindle Location 6563 from Mao: The Unknown Story) Afterward, he fled to Shanghai, and later to Taiwan where he and the rest of the Nationalists would be banished to forever.
On that very same day, April 23, America suddenly announced that the dollar would be set at 360 yen. This announcement caught almost everyone off guard, including high-ranking officials within the Japanese bureaucracy.
“This came to us as a bolt out of the blue,” said Kiichi Miyazawa. (Page 11 of Secret Talks between Tokyo and Washington)
This concession, which may have been the most important concession given to Japan in the postwar era, was undoubtedly a reward for helping to bring the Communists to power in China. The yen would remain fixed at this exchange rate for the next 22 years.
On May 6, the Netherlands and Indonesia reached an informal ceasefire agreement. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/05/07/84562921.html) On that same day, NSC 13/2 was revised and became known as NSC 13/3.
(chroniclesoftheendofhistory.blogspot.com/2011/08/on-66th-anniversary-of-end-of-wwii.html) This version finalized the long-term control of Okinawa and the Nanpo Islands by America. This version contained another concession, a concession on war reparations.
“It should be the policy of the United States Government that current transfers of reparations under unilateral U. S. directive should be terminated and every effort made to secure acceptance by the other reparations claimant countries of the principle that the reparations question as a whole should be reduced to the status of a dead letter.”
These concessions were undoubtedly given to Japan for the ceasefire in Indonesia and the Communist success in China. Though an informal ceasefire agreement was reached in Indonesia in May, the ceasefire did not become official until August 15, the fourth anniversary of the surrender of the Japanese military. On that day, the New York Times published an editorial on the significance of August 15.
“Aug. 15 has a special place on the calendar of the Pacific,” said the Times. “It is a day of anniversaries, a day of beginnings and a day of endings.”
The Times notes that India gained independence on August 15, 1947. The Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15, in 1948. The Times notes that on this date the ceasefire in Indonesia became official.
“It can be there, as elsewhere, the day of new beginnings, of changes for the better, of closer understandings,” said the Times.
“It was this day,” in 1945, “that marked the official end of hostilities in the Pacific. We knew, then, that the war was over. Today, four years later, we are not so sure.”
References:
New York Times editorial on the significance of August 15:
timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/08/15/85650705.html
From the time the ceasefire was signed until the time Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed on a resolution to their dispute, America compiled three peace drafts, one on September 7, another on October 13, and a third on November 2. From what I can tell, all three drafts were essentially the same. The last of these drafts, the one completed on November 2, was very punitive. Lat / Lon was restored in this draft. This draft allowed Japan to keep Okinawa north of 29 degrees but does not mention the Northern Territories. Japan would renounce “all territorial claims in the Antarctic region.” Japan would forfeit the Bonins. (Page 30, 86, 131, and 169 of Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific)
On the same this draft was completed, Indonesia and the Netherlands finally settled their differences and reached an agreement. (www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs62.aspx) Indonesia would gain their independence. The Dutch had to completely withdraw their military from Indonesia within a year of the agreement’s entry into force. But they got to keep their investments in Indonesia. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/11/03/84227502.html) Other items which the Dutch could not keep, like the public buildings, the infrastructure, their military bases, and even much of their military equipment, which they no longer had use for as they no longer had an empire to defend, the Indonesians bought from them. For example, on June 20 of the following year, the Dutch handed over their last air base to the Indonesians. They included in this transfer 200 airplanes. (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1950/06/21/129176572.html)
While the Dutch were not happy about losing Indonesia, they at least managed to protect their investments and were compensated for the investments they could not keep. The solution was the best the West could have hoped for at that point. The West signaled their approval of the agreement by immediately retreating on the peace treaty they had drafted on November 2. Immediately after the draft was completed, a copy was sent to William J. Sebald, the political advisor to Douglas MacArthur. After reading the draft, Sebald vociferously objected to its contents. He listed his objections in a document written on November 19. (Page 31, 33, and 88 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The Far Eastern situation has undergone a vast change during the past four years, largely to American disadvantage (with the single exception of our relations with Japan),” he said.
America “has a vital stake … in a politically stable and friendly Japan.” To that end, America should adopt a peace treaty favorable to Japan, unlike the current draft which he implied was “too severe.”
He argued that Japan should keep Takeshima and the Northern Territories. America should not, in his opinion, define the borders by drawing a line around Japan. That would have “serious psychological disadvantages.” He recommended “leaving room” for America to accept “certain other provisions which we can now anticipate.” This idea seems to be connected to his argument that America should not draw a line around Japan. If the peace treaty does not precisely define Japan's borders, that will leave America with the room to grant Japan possession of certain territories in the future, after the peace treaty is signed. This is exactly what happened with Okinawa and the Nanpo Islands, whose return would become connected with the independence movement in Vietnam.
What happened in the fall of 1949 was a repeat of what happened earlier. While things were in doubt, America was busy drafting a punitive peace treaty which, one way or another, they must have been leaked to the Japanese government, perhaps through their intelligence agencies. Then once the situation was resolved, the State Department stopped drafting the agreement and showed it to someone who pretended to be outraged by its contents. The objections made by this individual were subsequently taken into consideration and a more favorable treaty was drafted.
Some of the recommendations made by Sebald were reflected in a new draft finished on December 29. In this draft, Japan would keep Takeshima, Habomai, and Shikotan. The terms for Antarctica were changed slightly again. Japan would renounce “all rights, titles, and claims deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area.” (Page 33, 55, 61, 131, and 169 of Cold War Frontiers)
Dulles takes over
The big change occurred, however, a little bit later. In April, John Foster Dulles became the Consultant to the Secretary of State. The following month, in May, he “officially became responsible for overseeing the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty.” (Page 34 of Cold War Frontiers)
“A ‘generous peace’ line, with a primary objective of securing Japan for the Western bloc, was more strongly emphasized” from this point forward. (Page 36 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Korean War
In the summer, Dulles participated in peace treaty negotiations with Shigeru Yoshida, the prime minister of Japan.
“The result of my talk with Mr. Dulles was extremely good, and I am quite satisfied,” said Shigeru Yoshida on June 23. “Mr. Dulles was very sympathetic toward the attitude of Japan in treaty matters.” (timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1950/06/24/86443514.html)
To understand why Dulles was so sympathetic, you need to know what happened two days after he made these remarks. On that day, June 25, North Korea invaded South Korea. For the West, the Jeju Massacre was not enough. They needed a war to eliminate all Japanese influence from Korea. And they needed a war to split East Asia in half, with Japan on one side and China on the other.
Undefined borders
The “early drafts were very detailed and lengthy, not only in provision of the territorial disposition, but also in the other categories.” (Page 27 of Cold War Frontiers)
Attached to the October 13, 1949 draft was the following commentary:
“it is believed essential that the treaty deal clearly and specifically with all matters involved in the reestablishment of normal relations between the Allies and Japan. Unfortunately these include a number of questions, particularly with respect to property rights, which cannot be dealt with briefly, and if dealt with in general rather than specific terms, would be likely to be a source of dispute and recrimination later on.” (Page 29 of Cold War Frontiers)
Dulles ignored this advice. He “decided to make it shorter and simpler.” (Page 36 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the names of many islands, including Takeshima, were deleted.” (Page 36 of Cold War Frontiers)
“this shorter form of the treaty was insufficiently specific about the territorial demarcation,” said Hara. “It was in fact pointed out, within State Department, that this might lead to future territorial disputes, and Takeshima was mentioned in that context.” (Page 36 of Cold War Frontiers)
Drawing a fence around Japan.
“The Japanese had objected to the British proposal” (Page 41 of Cold War Frontiers)
“By not defining the territorial dispositions clearly in the Treaty, Dulles perhaps left some potential ‘wedges’ for defense of Japan against communist expansion, or to prevent any ‘domino effect,’ by retaining some potential sources of discord between Japan and its neighbors. Whether purposely or not, he planted the seeds of future disputes in the Treaty, and in the case of Takeshima, created a source of discord in preparation for the possible ‘loss of Korea.’” (Page 45 of Cold War Frontiers)
August / September 1950
“The treaty drafts of August and September 1950 dealt with these islands and the former Japanese Mandated Islands (Micronesia) in the same article. This could be interpreted as denying Japanese sovereignty over these islands, as Micronesia was placed under Japanese control as a result of the First World War, and Japan did not possess sovereignty over it.” (Page 172 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the USA would retain control of these islands as long as it needed” (Page 171 of Cold War Frontiers)
In discussions with other nations around the fall of 1950, America said that Japan would keep Takeshima. (Page 37 of Cold War Frontiers)
8/7/50: A new peace treaty for Japan is drafted. Dulles called it “a simple treaty.” No Lat / Lon was included. Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would be decided by either the UN or America, Britain, China, and Russia. Antarctica is not mentioned. The part where Japan would renounce certain territories was removed. Instead, Okinawa south of 29 degrees and the Bonins would be under U.S. trusteeship. (Page 34, 89, 131, and 170 of Cold War Frontiers)
9/15: Inchon
12/8/50: America imposes a total trade embargo on China.
12/12/50: “The task of preventing Japan from falling under Communist influence is increasingly great,” said John Foster Dulles. (Page 45 of Cold War Frontiers)
In January, the Communists began their “third phase offensive.”
“On the ground and the map it appeared they had won another victory; they had advanced the front line fifty to sixty miles across the whole breadth of the peninsula, and they had captured, for the second time, the South Korean capital.” (Kindle Location 1707 from A Short History of the Korean War)
1/22/51: The Dulles peace mission goes to Japan. (Page 37 of Cold War Frontiers)
1/25/51: During the Korean War, a UN counter-offensive begins. (Kindle Locations 7475-7476 from Mao: The Unknown Story)
1/27/51: MacArthur wants America to keep Okinawa. (Page 171 of Cold War Frontiers)
1/31/51: Japan tells America that they want Okinawa and the Bonins back “as soon as the need of trusteeship disappears.” (Page 171 of Cold War Frontiers)
March 1951
“in March pushed the front line back approximately to the 38th parallel.” (Page 23 of Cold War Frontiers)
3/1/51: A new draft of the peace treaty for Japan does not include the word “independence” for Korea and instead uses the word “renunciation” for it, Taiwan, Antarctica, and the Kuriles. Certain UN references were removed for Korea, Taiwan, and the Kuriles. The definition of the Kuriles would be left to bilateral agreement or a judicial decision. Includes the provision renouncing claims related to the activities of Japanese nationals in Antarctica. Okinawa and the Bonins are dealt in Article 4 (placed under U.S. trusteeship) while Micronesia is in Article 3. (Page 38, 90, and 131, and 172 of Cold War Frontiers)
The UN launched a new offensive, Operation Ripper, on March 7, to recapture Seoul. (Kindle Location 1759 from A Short History of the Korean War) They succeeded in recapturing the city on March 15. (Kindle Location 1762 from A Short History of the Korean War)
By the end of March, the UN had successfully moved the front line up to the 38th Parallel “for almost the entire breadth of the peninsula.” (Kindle Location 1768 from A Short History of the Korean War)
By April 3, the UN knew that the Communists were gearing up for something big.
“There was intelligence evidence that the Communists were building up for a new major offensive in the spring,” said Stokesbury. (Kindle Locations 1776 from A Short History of the Korean War)
The British
In the spring of 1951, the British became heavily involved in the drafting of the peace treaty. They demanded that America draft a punitive treaty. They were angry with Japan. Japan had, after all, kicked them out of India and Myanmar. More broadly, Japan essentially kicked Europe out of the Far East. This did not go over well in Britain. In March, the British compiled a draft peace treaty which “described all the Soviet-occupied islands between Hokkaido and Kamchatka as outside Japan.” (Page 92 of Cold War Frontiers) Japan would have to forfeit not only the Kuriles, but also Habomai and Shikotan.
On April 7, Britain gave America a revised. This draft allowed Japan to keep Habomai and Shikotan. But it was still extremely harsh. Japan would have to forfeit Okinawa, the Bonins, Takeshima, and all their claims to Antarctica and promise not to make future claims for the continent. (Page 39, 92, 131, and 172 of Cold War Frontiers)
But suddenly, towards the end of April, Britain and America made the peace terms more favorable for Japan. On April 23, Britain agreed to drop the prohibition against future Japanese claims to the Antarctic. (Page 132 of Cold War Frontiers) This concession was probably a response to what happened earlier that day when Japan held its local elections. It was “Japan’s biggest election in history.” Over 36 million people voted. The “Communist candidates took a thumping.” (select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0A11FF345A1A7B93C6AB178FD85F458585F9)
“Latest returns available showed not one Communist had been elected Mayor of any city,” said the New York Times. “That was true even in Nagano prefecture, which formerly had five Communist Mayors.”
The election results undoubtedly pleased the West, who wanted to split Japan and China by forcing Japan to form an alliance with America while forcing China to form an alliance with Russia.
The day after the elections, on April 24, the Communists began “a major onslaught” against the UN forces in Korea. (select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20D11FF345A1A7B93C6AB178FD85F458585F9)
“Chinese Communist troops tore a big hole in United Nations lines today and plunged south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel in central Korea,” said the New York Times.
“The attack was made behind the heaviest artillery barrages that the enemy has fired during the Korean war.”
The following day, on April 25, during negotiations with the British, American argued that precisely defining Japan’s borders “would have a bad psychological effect on the Japanese.” (Page 41 of Cold War Frontiers) This concession, presumably, was made because of the recent Communist onslaught in Korea. The Chinese Communists came to Japan’s rescue. The attack was apparently made to pressure the West into providing more favorable peace terms to Japan. Indeed the peace terms would become more favorable for Japan over the next month or so.
On May 3, Britain and America finished compiling a new peace treaty draft. (Page 40, 93, and 137 of Cold War Frontiers) The Lat / Lon was dropped as was the UN resolution formula. Takeshima was not mentioned. The draft gave the Kuriles to Russia. America wants the draft to include Japan’s renunciation to Antarctica based on the activities of its nationals.
Further concessions were forthcoming on May 14, when the New York Times reported that Japan would soon “remove from the purge about 150,000 men ordered out of public life during the early stages of the occupation for wartime or pre-war activities or membership in organizations then considered agencies of the militarist regime.” (select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50F1EF93E591A7B93C7A8178ED85F458585F9)
The Japanese government was only able to revoke the purge because of the consent of the U.S. government. In revoking the purge, Japan was “acting under the authority given by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway.”
Even more concessions came two days later on May 16 when America announced an economic program which would use Japanese industry “to help build democratic might against the threat of Communist aggression.” (select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0E11F63E591A7B93C5A8178ED85F458585F9)
“The program offers Japan the fullest economic cooperation and assistance, including United States Government and private credit,” said the New York Times. “It offers Japan a chance to re-enter the world market fully.”
However, under the program, “Japan must seek new sources for raw materials.” Japan could no longer turn to China for those items. She would instead have to work with Southeast Asia. Japanese industry would be used “to increase production of raw materials and also the industrial potentiality of Southeastern Asia” and they would “supply Southeast Asia and other areas with capital and consumer.” The “United States economic and technical missions in Southeast Asia” would work together with Japan to implement the program.
Two days after this program was unveiled, on May 18, the New York Times reported that, “Britain and the United States were reliably reported today to have eliminated most of their difference of opinion on the terms of a peace treaty with Japan.” (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F2061FFE39591A7B93C0AB178ED85F458585F9)
Apparently happy with the progress made in the peace negotiations, and the concessions made to Japan in general, the Chinese Communists decided that now was the time to end their spring offensive.
“The Communists’ vaunted spring offensive ground to a standstill” on May 21. (query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F2061FFE39591A7B93C0AB178ED85F458585F9)
The New York Times reported that “the enemy was pulling back in many sectors.”
Negotiations
By the summer of 1951, the West had achieved its two primary goals for the Korean War. The West had slaughtered any remnants of Japanese influence in Korea. America had imposed a total trade embargo on China. The West had but one goal remaining. Use the Korean War to resolve the Vietnam War. This goal, however, did not prevent America from at least starting peace negotiations with the Communists over Korea.
On June 3, Kim Il-sung went to China. He wants to start negotiations with America. (Kindle Location 7504 from Mao: The Unknown Story) On that very same day, Dulles went to London. During this trip, Britain and America would agree on the peace treaty for Japan. (Page 65 of Cold War Frontiers)
By this time, most people realized that Russia would not sign the treaty. Dulles recommended that the peace treaty not specify the recipient of the Kuriles. He notes that if Russia does not sign the treaty, people might think the islands still belong to Japan. (Page 94 of Cold War Frontiers) This was the position the British and Americans eventually settled on. (Page 95 of Cold War Frontiers)
Dulles says Okinawans are “ethnically close to Japan.” He suggests an arrangement where Okinawans would be Japanese but under an U.S. administration. (Page 174 of Cold War Frontiers)
Though the West had accomplished their goals for the Korean War, they had not by this point been able to do the same in Vietnam. The West nevertheless went ahead and finished the peace treaty for Japan. They did this to prevent Japan from turning Communist.
“Prolonged occupation by the Western capitalist countries might inflame Japanese nationalism, thus facilitating the growth of Soviet and Chinese communist influence, and risking communist control of Japan,” said Hara. (Page 65 of Cold War Frontiers)
By this time, Japan had apparently become fed up with the West stalling over the peace treaty and decided to force the issue. Either complete a peace treaty or we’re going Communist. And if we go Communist we’re going to join hands with China and the rest of the Far East and adopt a revolutionary, anti-western ideology. In the end, the West decided that signing a peace treaty with Japan was the better option. But they still left certain issues unresolved, namely the status of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands. America kept those islands until the situation with Vietnam was resolved. Though they did not say this explicitly, the British hinted this was the case in one of the documents they wrote right before the peace treaty was signed.
“In view of the complicated nature of the problem in the various areas concerned, it is considered neither necessary nor desirable to attempt by means of the Japanese Peace Treaty to determine what the final disposition of these territories will be,” said the British Foreign Office. (Page 43 of Cold War Frontiers)
I should mention that in this case the British were not only referring to Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, but to all the islands which would be under dispute in succeeding years.
The ceasefire negotiations in Korea began on July 7. (Page 95 of Cold War Frontiers) The final version of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was released to the public a scant five days later, on July 12. (Page 5 of Cold War Frontiers) The close proximity of these dates suggests that the Allies were waiting for the negotiations to begin before releasing the peace treaty to the public.
The treaty was signed two months later, on September 8.
New Zealand and Australia before the conference
“Despite the communist-inspired unrest in populous Southeast Asia, and despite expanding Soviet influence in Northeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand clung to the belief that the principal threat to their security would come from Japan” (Page 140 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the most satisfactory treatment of Japan from New Zealand's point of view would be one which would at the same time (1) prevent Japan from falling under communist control, (2) make Japan a bulwark against Communist expansion in the Far East, and (3) eliminate the possibility of future Japanese aggression in the western Pacific. New Zealand realizes that the perfect realization of all three of these ends its impracticable, and it favors steps that would achieve the third even at the cost of sacrificing the attainment of the other two.” (Page 134 of Cold War Frontiers)
“New Zealand has no intention of lying down with such ‘strange bedfellows’ as Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam…” (Page 135 of Cold War Frontiers)
At the conference
Japan asked America to declare “that Shikotan and the Habomais were not part of the Kuriles.” (Page 95 of Cold War Frontiers) Dulles stated “that the Habomais were not included in the Kuriles, thus supporting Japanese ownership of them.” (Page 177 of Cold War Frontiers)
Okinawa
With regards to Okinawa, Dulles declared that Japan had “residual sovereignty” over the islands. (Page 175 of Cold War Frontiers) This declaration created “a favorable impression in Japan.” (Page 175 of Cold War Frontiers)
The San Francisco System
“The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the international agreement that largely determined the post-war political order in the region.” (Page 3 of Cold War Frontiers)
The San Francisco System left Japan with territorial disputes with all of her neighbors, Russia, China, and Korea.
The peace treaty left unresolved the status of Okinawa, the Bonin Islands, the Kurile Islands, Taiwan, and Takeshima.
“Neither the final devolution nor the precise limits of these territories were specified in the Peace Treaty, and this created various ‘unresolved problems’ in the region. The appearance of these features in the Treaty was neither coincidence nor error; it followed careful deliberation and several revisions. These issues were purposely left unresolved” (Page 186 of Cold War Frontiers)
“some, if not all, of these problems were intentionally created or left unresolved to protect US strategic interests” (Page 4 of Cold War Frontiers)
By leaving these problems unresolved, “this left room for future argument” over what the actual borders were. (Page 12 of Cold War Frontiers)
Korea
“neither Korean government was invited to the Peace Conference” (Page 15 of Cold War Frontiers)
“normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the two Koreas was left as another ‘unresolved problem.’” (Page 15 of Cold War Frontiers)
“concern for the burden that Korean participation in the Treaty might inflict on Japan’s economy.” (Page 46 of Cold War Frontiers)
The peace treaty left the status of Takeshima undefined. (Page 15 of Cold War Frontiers)
That the West left the status of Takeshima undefined shows that the West was not really concerned about Communist expansion. While the peace treaty was being drafted, there were those who argued that Japan should keep Takeshima. They worried that the Communists might conquer the entire Korean peninsula. If Takeshima were part of Korea, the Communists would then take control of those islands. To prevent this, some officials argued that “it was preferable that islands in the Sea of Japan, such as Takeshima, not be Korean territory.” (Page 32 of Cold War Frontiers)
But in the peace treaty, the West did not give the islands to Japan. This shows that the West was more interested in punishing Japan for liberating East Asia than in protecting East Asia from a possible Communist takeover. It shows the West did not consider Communist expansion a credible threat, at least in Korea.
Kuriles
“The Kuriles were purposely left undefined to create a source of dispute between Japan and the USSR, and also to leave room for any future contingency. Psychologically, Soviet occupation of possibly Japanese territories would be negatively perceived among Japanese, while a sympathetic US attitude would be positively perceived.” (Page 98 of Cold War Frontiers)
Antarctica
“The provision for territorial dispositions adopted in the Peace Treaty included Japanese renunciation of Antarctica. However, this was neither to close the window on Japan's future territorial claims nor to forbid whaling, which was considered important to Japan's economy.” (Page 141 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The USA, being responsible for reconstructing the Japanese economy, soon realized the importance of whaling in providing fats and proteins for the Japanese people's diet.” (Page 139 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the USA refused to forbid Japanese whaling but compromised by having observers accompany the Japanese whaling fleets to see that the regulations were observed.” (Page 139 of Cold War Frontiers)
China
“(1) The Treaty did not specify to which country or government Japan renounced Formosa and the Pescadores. (2) It did not define the limits of these territories.” (Page 51 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Taiwan's future would not be determined by the peace treaty itself; and neither China would be represented at the peace conference.” (Page 65 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Dulles could foresee the Senate rejecting ratification of the peace treaty, if it were seen as providing an opportunity for Japan to become politically close to communist China.” (Page 65 of Cold War Frontiers)
Right before the peace treaty was signed, George Marshall asked for confirmation that Communist China would not sign the peace treaty. (Page 66 of Cold War Frontiers) This is the same George Marshall that came to the aid of the Chinese Communists during their civil war with the Nationalists. The same George Marshall who forced the Nationalists into a ceasefire which saved the Communists from destruction. After saving the Communists, one might have thought that Marshall was secretly sympathetic to their cause. That theory was shown to be false, however, when he made sure that Communist China would not sign the peace treaty. His actions show that he wanted China to become communist. And then once China turned communist, he wanted to make sure China remained hostile to Japan by not signing the peace treaty. His actions show that he wanted to split East Asia in half, with Japan on the side of the capitalists and China on the side of the Communists.
That the war was a war of liberation can best be seen by the fact that the war did not officially end until 1951, a full six years after Japan surrendered.
Final border decided
Towards the end of the year, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, America and the Communists decided that the current line separating their militaries would be the final border demarcation regardless of what happened afterwards.
The Communists declared that the border should be “based on the current line of contact, so that no matter what might happen between that time and the final armistice, the line as of early November would be definitive.” (Kindle Location 2135 from A Short History of the Korean War) Matthew Ridgway, the general in charge of UN forces in Korea, “strongly protested against this, saying that it would totally nullify any military pressure the UN might subsequently exert.” Nevertheless, America agreed to the proposal. With the final borders essentially set, all incentive for a concerted ground offensive from either side was lost. After the agreement, “it became apparent that the ground war in Korea was going nowhere.” (Kindle Location 2989 from A Short History of the Korean War) The Eighth Army was ordered to “respond only to pressure from the Communists.” (Kindle Location 2992 from A Short History of the Korean War) They were told “that there would be no real offensives undertaken.” The Communists had no intention of making a big push southward either.
“If the UN forces were going only to react to a Communist advance, and the Communists were not going to advance, then there was a de facto cease-fire, or at least a marked diminution of the level of hostilities.” (Kindle Location 2996 from A Short History of the Korean War)
The war had “reached a stalemate.” (Kindle Location 3000 from A Short History of the Korean War)
That stalemate continued through 1952.
“Both sides agreed to play by the rules during 1952, and the rules strictly limited what either might do.” (Kindle Locations 3038-3039 from A Short History of the Korean War)
Though the a final border demarcation had been agreed to before the end of 1951, the war continued for more than a year and a half afterward, until the summer of 1953. The West continued the war in the hopes that the Viet Minh would eventually surrender without the strong support of the Chinese Communists, who were tied down in Korea. This plan was a miserable failure. But that was the plan.
That the Chinese Communists waited until after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed before demanding a final border demarcation suggests that they wanted to keep the option open for a new offensive until the treaty was signed. They were almost certainly doing Japan a big favor. Unless the West signed a favorable peace treaty for Japan, they would resume their attack. At least that was the threat. But once America signed the treaty, a treaty that Japan was reasonable happy with, the Communists demanded a final border demarcation to effectively end the Korean War. The West agreed.
The Chinese Communists almost certainly knew that the war would not end soon after the final border demarcation was decided. Earlier that year, on March 1, Mao told Stalin that China was “ready to persist in a long-term war, to spend several years consuming several hundred thousand American lives, so they will back down.” (Kindle Location 7481 from Mao: The Unknown Story)
Indeed China did spend several years fighting the U.S. military, a little over two years from the date Mao made his declaration. I doubt Mao ever believed that America would back down. But Mao knew that everyone wanted him to continue the war for a while. And he was willing to do that.
After the conference
3/21/53: Russia tells Zhou Enlai that the Korean War must end. (Kindle Locations 7664-7665 from Mao: The Unknown Story)
5/12/53: Mao orders an end to the Korean War. (Kindle Locations 7697-7698 from Mao: The Unknown Story)
7/27/53: Korean War armistice
“Shigemitsu inquired whether the USA would be prepared to take the initiative in convening a conference to discuss the disposition of the Kuriles and Ryukyus. Dulles' reaction was negative” (Page 96 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Japan’s conclusion of a peace treaty with the USSR would put the question of normalizing relations between Japan and communist China on the agenda. That, too, was unacceptable to the USA, as the PRC’s intervention in the Korean War had made it a prime target for US containment strategy.” (Page 97 of Cold War Frontiers)
Russia
“Japan and the USSR were about to settle their border problem and sign a peace treaty with a ‘two islands’ transfer in 1956, when the USA intervened to block the process.” (Page 99 of Cold War Frontiers)
“In August 1956, using Article 26, which Dulles himself had inserted in the Peace Treaty for a ‘future contingency,’” (Page 177 of Cold War Frontiers)
“to argue that if Japan made concessions to the USSR over its ‘northern territories,’ the USA could claim Okinawa.” (Page 96 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The US administration officially supported Japan’s ‘four islands’ claim, not because it considered all these islands distinct from the Kuriles, but because it knew the claim would be unacceptable to the USSR. The primary objectives of US Cold War policy in the Asia-Pacific were to secure Japan for the Western bloc, and to prevent it from achieving a rapprochement with the communist bloc.” (Page 97 of Cold War Frontiers)
“In a Joint Declaration, the Soviets promised to transfer Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan ‘after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.’” (Page 97 of Cold War Frontiers)
Okinawa
America had promised to return Okinawa and the Bonin Islands “when security interests of the Free World in the Far East will permit realization of this desire.” (Page 178 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Johnson's promise was a political compromise, rendered necessary by the growth of movements demanding reversion, not only in Okinawa, but all over Japan. Many Japanese opposed the US intervention in the Vietnam War. The increased use of the Okinawa bases for that war further provoked anti-US demonstrations, and there were signs that the Japanese socialists and communists were regaining popularity.” (Page 181 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the Senkaku problem emerged in parallel with the Okinawa reversion movement.” (Page 178 of Cold War Frontiers)
“There is no sign that possession of the Senkaku Islands was disputed in the early post-war years.” (Page 162 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Before the reversion, there was certainly an understanding in the US government of Senkaku as part of Okinawa. However, the Nixon administration adopted a policy of taking ‘no position on sovereignty,’ while returning ‘administrative rights’ to Japan, thus leaving the dispute to the Japanese and Chinese.” (Page 179 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Unquestionably the United States ‘administered’ the Senkaku Islands as part of the Okinawa administration, and such an administration took place (a) without question or issue raised by the United States as to its powers to administer, and (b) apparently without Taiwan making a claim or attempting to claim the Senkaku until oil becomes an issue,” said the Department of Defense. (Page 180 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Senkaku dispute “would make the US military presence in Okinawa more acceptable to Japan.” (Page 181 of Cold War Frontiers)
“While emphasizing the ‘China threat,’ and ‘defense of Japan’ to the Japanese, Nixon managed to secure tacit Chinese approval of the US presence in Okinawa as ‘defense from Japan,’ thus exploiting China’s fear of a revival of Japanese militarism.” (Page 181 of Cold War Frontiers)
Wedges
“America’s bargaining position would be stronger when America was closer to both communist giants than either was to the other,” said Kissinger. (Page 182 of Cold War Frontiers)
“A similar line of analysis was probably also applied to policy toward Japan and China, rising economic and political giants in Asia.” (Page 182 of Cold War Frontiers)
“A ‘wedge’ called the ‘Northern Territories problem’ was set in place with Japan’s ‘four islands’ claim against the USSR in the mid-1950s, and in the early 1970s, when Okinawa was returned to Japan, another ‘wedge’ called ‘Senkaku/Diaoyu’ was set in place between Japan and China.” (Page 182 of Cold War Frontiers)
“if the status of these islands was left vague, the basis for a future dispute would be laid. Thus a potential ‘wedge’ was left between Japan and China.” (Page 176 of Cold War Frontiers)
Post Vietnam War
“from the viewpoint of US China policy, China’s ocean frontier problems of Okinawa/Senkaku, the Spratlys, and the Paracels may be viewed as ‘wedges’ of containment of the PRC” (Page 188 of Cold War Frontiers)
The problem remains
“the Asia-Pacific region at present still awaits the real end of the Cold War.” (Page 195 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the communist and authoritarian states continue to exist, and remain potential ‘threats’ to their neighbors to this date.” (Page 189 of Cold War Frontiers)
“in the early 1990s, when the other countries of the industrialized ‘West’ were improving their relations with the USSR (later Russia), following the end of US-USSR Cold War, Japan was in a way left behind due to this territorial problem.” (Page 194 of Cold War Frontiers)
“If the USA and/or other countries improve their relations in this region, while the bilateral problems remain unresolved, Japan may find itself left in the cold or even isolated.” (Page 194 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The strong anti-Japanese sentiments from the pre–Cold War era remaining in the Asia-Pacific could possibly become the driving force for a new structure of confrontation in East Asia, and Japan’s ‘unresolved problems’ with its neighbors could provide a stimulus for such an undesirable development.” (Page 194 of Cold War Frontiers)
“The idea of a ‘common enemy’ or ‘common threat’ helps unify people or countries. It can engender nationalism, or develop into partnerships or military alliances. Even where no significant threat exists, political leaders can sometimes allege that a particular country poses one.” (Page 194 of Cold War Frontiers)
“If the countries that have ‘unresolved problems’ with Japan achieve reunification, or form a common front, Japan could find itself isolated behind the Acheson Line, that was drawn over half a century ago.” (Page 194 of Cold War Frontiers)
“in 2005, the Chinese and South Korean leaders confirmed that both countries were in the same position and going to coordinate their protest against Japan for its interpretation of history, especially over the controversy of the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine,” (Page 194 to 195 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Even though tension relaxes, if the fundamental structure remains unchanged, so does the possibility of future resurgence of confrontation. The best defense for peace is the removal of sources of conflict.” (Page 191 of Cold War Frontiers)
“By being asserted over a long period, their claims appear to have become firmly established as domestic policy norms, and as involving each government's ‘face,’ pride, or integrity.” (Page 192 of Cold War Frontiers)
“With the collapse of the USSR and global-scale development of democracy in recent years, the ‘Cold War’ era ‘domino’ theory, in which the territorial problems played a convenient role to ‘contain’ communism, is no longer valid.” (Page 193 of Cold War Frontiers)
“In seeking solutions of those problems, it seems reasonable to remember their common origin in the ‘San Francisco System,’ and appeal for cooperation to the ‘nations concerned.’” (Page 193 of Cold War Frontiers)
“as before, when US interests did not favor clear territorial dispositions of Japan against the background of the emerging Cold War in Asia, present US strategy may also not necessarily favor clear resolutions of these ‘unresolved problems.’” (Page 193 of Cold War Frontiers)
“Continuance of tensions in the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait would help validate the missile-defense network development that the US military has been promoting for some time, and for which Micronesia, particularly the RMI, is an important test range.” (Page 193 of Cold War Frontiers)
A solution
“The USA will remain important to Japanese diplomacy, but in the longer term their positions could diverge greatly.” (Page 195 of Cold War Frontiers)
“it seems necessary for Japan to avert possible isolation, open up diplomatic alternatives for its future, and build constructive relations with its neighbors by solving the pending questions and removing the ‘wedges’ or ‘walls’ dividing them.” (Page 195 of Cold War Frontiers)
“One important step may be to adopt an ‘open archive’ policy. Under the so-called thirty year rule diplomatic documents are generally opened after 30 years. Making an exception to the rule, the Japanese government has not opened materials related to the disputes in which Japan is involved. However, if a nation is serious about solving these problems, it seems to be a necessary step to adopt this policy” (Page 195 of Cold War Frontiers)
America predicts split between the China and Russia
“The USA then foresaw that in the long run China would split from the USSR” (Page 54 of Cold War Frontiers)
The Chinese Communists on Okinawa reversion
“Okinawa is a part of Japanese territory and [the PRC] supports the struggle in Okinawa demanding the return of administrative rights to Japan.” (Page 176 of Cold War Frontiers)
British opinion on China
“the UK appeared to have a different preference, i.e., it desired ‘a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period.’” (Page 53 of Cold War Frontiers)
“the UK was interested in regaining its pre-war semi-colonialist status in China.” (Page 53 of Cold War Frontiers)
America restrains the Nationalists
“Truman also requested the KMT government to stop fighting against the continent.” (Page 55 of Cold War Frontiers)
“what was ‘contained’ was not only the communist ‘liberation’ of Taiwan, but also Chiang Kai-shek’s aspiration to recover mainland China.” (Page 55 of Cold War Frontiers)
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